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Retaining skilled doctors in the Navy’s Medical Corps has become increasingly difficult 
due to the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) and lucrative positions outside the military. 
This thesis estimates probit models to evaluate the effect that the civilian-military pay 
gap has on the overall Medical Corps retention rate across 19 specialties using data 
gathered from Bureau of Medicine and Surgery and Medical Group Management 
Association for Fiscal Year (FY) 2002 to FY2011. In particular, this study measures the 
overall retention elasticity and elasticity estimates for three main specialty groups 
(primary care, surgical specialties, and other specialties) and 19 individual specialties. 
Furthermore, projection models are employed to predict the Medical Corps’ future 
retention rates. Finally, this study seeks to understand if the protracted GWOT has an 
effect on the retention behavior of the Navy’s Medical Corps. 
The results indicate that a 1% increase in the pay gap reduces the overall retention 
probability by 0.24%. The surgical group shows the highest retention elasticity (–0.31), 
while the other specialties group exhibits the least responsiveness (–0.19). The projection 
models estimate that the aggregate retention probability for FY2012 will be one 
percentage point lower than the actual retention rate of FY2011 (58%). Finally, the 
prolonged GWOT has reduced the overall retention rate by 14.1 percentage points. 
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 Navy Medicine is an essential aspect and a vital component of the  
United States Navy. Its mission statement reads: “We enable readiness, wellness, and 
healthcare to Sailors, Marines, their families, and all others entrusted to us worldwide be 
it on land or at sea (Bureau of Medicine and Surgery, 2013).” In order to achieve its 
mission, the Navy’s Bureau of Medicine and Surgery (BUMED) has to meet certain 
manpower requirements. In the last 10 years, due to the Global War on Terrorism 
(GWOT) and the country’s economic recession, there has been an increased concern 
about BUMED’s ability to meet its manning requirements, and thus the ability to 
maintain BUMED’s recommended manning level of fully trained and experienced 
physicians. An inadequate number of medical personnel would not only threaten the 
Navy’s ability to meet its mission, but it would also affect the Navy with low retention 
rates and high manpower turnover. 
Retaining skilled and qualified employees is one of the foremost challenges that 
all organizations share, including the military, for many reasons. Organizations that face 
a high turnover rate incur high costs when recruiting qualified applicants to fill the 
vacancies and additional costs to train these new employees. Second, the cost of 
productivity loss and degraded readiness, as a result of high attrition, is inestimable, but 
existent (Weiss et al., 2003). Indeed, attrition in the military is more problematic than in 
civilian organizations: mainly, in occupations where a civilian-military pay gap exists and 
when the economy is thriving (Weiss et al., 2003). Military physicians who face a 
positive, growing gap between military and civilian compensation are more likely to 
pursue an increasingly attractive civilian career, especially since their skills and 
qualifications are easily transferable. In addition, because of the existing short supply of 
physicians in the civilian market and the high cost of recruiting and training new 
physicians to become specialists, the civilian sector competes to attract fully trained 




affects military physicians’ retention rates, contributes to an increased turnover of 
unobligated healthcare specialists, and puts stress on the military’s personnel planning to 
retain these specialists. 
 A physician’s decision to stay in or leave the Navy after serving his or her initial 
active duty obligation (ADO) is influenced by many factors such as working conditions, 
military lifestyle, and/or financial compensation (Shepherd, 2001). The GWOT, which 
caused an increase in operation tempo (OPTEMPO), has affected the providers’ lifestyle 
with increased deployments compared to the pre-GWOT period. Since financial 
compensation and individual lifestyle has a significant influence on the healthcare 
provider’s decision to stay in or leave the Navy, this can significantly impact Navy 
providers who decide to remain in the Navy. This will increase their clinical workload 
and level of stress in order to compensate for those who left. Military providers receive 
various types of pays. 
All Navy personnel receive Regular Military Compensation (RMC),1 which is a 
combination of basic pay, basic allowance for subsistence (BAS), and basic allowance for 
housing (BAH). Their basic pay is determined by their pay grades and years of service in 
the military., whereas BAH is determined by geographic duty location, pay grade, and 
dependency status. Furthermore, to help with the financial compensation, the government 
uses various bonuses called Special Pays. The Special Pays are discretionary bonuses 
given to Medical Corps officers intended to assist in alleviating shortages of medical 
officers in various U.S. Navy medical specialties and to help reduce the pay gap between 
military medical officers and their civilian counterparts (Office of the Chief of Naval 
Operations, 2005). 
 When an unobligated, fully-trained military physician leaves the military, his or 
her best alternative is to join the civilian sector. Military physicians, who earn 
significantly lower pay compared to their civilian counterparts, are more likely to be 
attracted to an opportunity to leave the Navy as soon as they complete their obligatory 
service. In order to reduce the pay gap between the military and the private sector, the 
                                                 
1 Specific rates and entitlements can be found in the Department of Defense Financial Management 
Regulation (DODFMR), Military Pay, Policy, and Procedures, volume 7, part A, DOD 7000. 
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U.S. Navy has various types of Special Pay plans to minimize this gap. Therefore, the 
first phase of this thesis will examine the military-civilian healthcare pay gap. We will 
create a comparison of Navy and private sector physicians’ total compensation across 
19 specialties to determine whether a gap exists and, if so, the size of the gap. 
 In phase two, using a logistic regression model, we will investigate how the 
civilian-military pay gap for healthcare specialists impacts the probability that a fully 
trained healthcare specialist will stay in the Navy for an additional fiscal year after 
completing his or her initial ADO. The model’s specifications will control for all 
observable factors that affect the retention of unobligated, fully trained specialists. 
 In phase three, we will use the model from phase two to estimate the retention 
elasticities for each specialty. This will provide information on the sensitivity of a 
physician’s stay/leave decision based on the monetary incentive provided. The final 
phase will create an Excel-based projection model that predicts the retention rates of 
those in each specialty by adjusting the Special Pay level. This projection model would 
allow BUMED to set appropriate pay incentives in order to retain the desired healthcare 
specialists to meet its manpower requirements. 
A. PURPOSE 
The purpose of this study is to reevaluate the effect of the civilian-military pay 
gap on the retention of unobligated Navy medical specialists. This thesis will replicate a 
previous study conducted by Shayne Brannman, Richard Miller, Theresa Kimble, and 
Eric Christensen at the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) in 2002. In the last 10 years, 
with the prolonged GWOT and recent economic recession, the retention and attrition of 
Navy healthcare specialists has been challenged. This research will estimate the retention 
elasticity of each specialty using multivariate analysis and then incorporate the estimates 
into a projection model to accurately forecast future retention rates. This will help 
BUMED better assess its manning projections, as well as set adequate special and 
incentive pay rates to maintain the desired manning of skilled and experienced medical 




B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 There are several primary questions that this research will attempt to answer: 
 How does a change in the civilian-military healthcare specialist pay gap 
affect the retention of Navy medical specialists? 
 What are the retention elasticity estimates for unobligated, fully trained 
Navy physicians with respect to civilian-military healthcare specialist pay 
gap changes? 
 What are the projected retention rates for Navy medical specialists, and 
how would adjusting Special Pay incentives influence their retention? 
 Secondary questions that this research will attempt to answer are: 
 How has the retention rate of Navy medical specialists changed from 
Fiscal Year (FY) 2002 through FY2011? Has it coincided with changes in 
the civilian-military ratio? 
 Have the prolonged GWOT and recent economic downturn influenced the 
Navy’s medical specialists’ retention rate from FY2002 through FY2011? 
C. ORGANIZATION 
 This thesis is broken down into five chapters. Chapter II provides a 
comprehensive literature review of prior studies of military retention and the effect of 
Special Pays to retain Medical Corps providers. Chapter III will discuss the variables that 
were used to create the model, and will provide a summary of the descriptive statistics 
and retention projection model for Navy healthcare specialists. Chapter IV will provide 
the marginal effects and the elasticity estimates, and review how pay elasticity affects 
retention. Chapter V will provide a summary of the results, along with conclusions and 
recommendations. 
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II. INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND AND  
LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Retaining skilled and qualified employees is one of the foremost challenges that 
all organizations share, including the military, for several reasons. First, organizations 
that face a high turnover rate incur high costs to attract qualified applicants to fill the 
vacancies and additional costs to train these new employees. Second, the cost of 
productivity loss and degraded readiness, as a result of high attrition, is inestimable 
(Weiss et al., 2003). Indeed, attrition in the military is more problematic; mainly, in 
occupations where a civilian-military pay gap exists and when the economy is thriving 
(Weiss et al., 2003). Military physicians who face a positive and growing gap between 
military and civilian compensations are more likely to pursue an increasingly attractive 
civilian employment, especially since their skills are easily transferable. In addition, 
because of the existing short supply of physicians in the civilian market and the high cost 
to recruit and train a new physician to become a specialist, the civilian sector competes to 
attract fully trained military physicians. This greatly affects military physicians’ 
retention, contributes to an increased turnover of unobligated healthcare specialists, and 
puts stress on the military’s personnel planning to retain these specialists. 
This section provides a summary of the Medical Corps’ institutional background 
and discusses prior studies of retention and pay gaps in the military healthcare profession. 
The first part provides information on the Medical Corps’ accession source, bonus pay, 
and retention in the Medical Corps. The second part offers an overview of military 
retention models. It discusses empirical models and different methodologies used in 
previous studies of military retention. The third part summarizes previous empirical 
evidence of military retention. Since one of the primary objectives of this thesis is to 
estimate the retention elasticity for unobligated, fully trained Navy physicians with 
respect to changes in the civilian-military pay gap, this part mainly focuses on the 
reenlistment-pay elasticity estimates found in prior literature. This section includes a 
discussion of how and why these estimates varied over time. The fourth part of the 
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chapter offers a thorough review of prior studies of military physicians’ retention. This 
thesis is a continuation of prior literature that has been conducted on military physicians’ 
retention. It specifically examines the effect of the civilian-military pay differential on the 
retention of unobligated, fully trained Navy specialists and updates retention-pay 
elasticity estimates for 19 specialties. Therefore, methodologies used in previous studies, 
as well as past studies’ findings, form the foundation of this research. The final part of 
this chapter is a review of prior literature on the effect of OPTEMPO on the retention of 
military healthcare professionals. Since one of the secondary questions of this thesis 
inquires about the effect of the protracted GWOT on Navy physicians’ retention, it is 
worth reviewing prior studies in this domain. 
B. INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND 
1. Accession Source 
 Even though this study’s focus is not on the impact that accession sources have on 
retention, knowing the different accession sources is important to better understand how 
the pay gap may influence the stay/leave decision. The Navy is able to provide an 
incentive for future doctors to join by paying for their medical school. Once the cost of 
medical school is paid, however, the question becomes how long will doctors stay? How 
long a Medical Corps officer will stay or how long their ADO service will be is 
determined by the accession source. Once their ADO is completed, the first decision that 
the physician faces is whether to stay on as a Navy doctor, or to leave and continue their 
career in the civilian sector. 
 There are many ways to become a medical officer in the U.S. Navy. The three 
categories of accession are: medical students, medical residents, and practicing 
profession. These three sources are the primary methods used by Navy recruiters to fulfill 
the Medical Corps’ manning requirements. Below are details of each accession source 
(U.S. Navy, 2013): 
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 Medical Students: 
o Health Professions Scholarship Program (HPSP): This is a 
medical school program, where the students do not have to attend a 
military medical school. 
 A monthly stipend of $2,122 is provided to help cover 
living expenses for up to 48 months. 
 A sign-on bonus of up to $20,000. 
 Students receive 100% tuition coverage during medical 
school. 
 A four-year active duty obligation. 
o Navy Health Services Collegiate Program (HSCP): Similar to 
the HPSP program, a student can receive from $157,000 to 
$269,000 while attending medical school. This includes: 
 A monthly military salary. 
 A generous housing allowance.* 
 A comprehensive health-care benefits package. 
 A four-year active duty obligation. 
*Navy HSCP housing allowance is based on medical school location. Increased offer 
amounts are available in areas with a higher cost of living. 
o Uniformed Services University of the Health Science (USUHS): 
The USUHS is the nation’s federal health sciences university. 
Health professionals serve in the DoD and the United States Public 
Health Service. 
 Students’ tuition is waived by the DoD. 
 Students receive the full salary of a junior officer. 
 Students receive the benefits of a junior officer. 
 A seven-year active-duty obligation. 
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 Medical Residents: 
o Financial Assistance Program (FAP): Residents may receive 
supplemental income in medical residency through the Navy, 
which may offer $275,000 or more during students’ medical 
residency. This includes: 
 An annual grant of $45,000 for up to four years. 
 A monthly stipend of $2,122 to help cover living expenses 
for up to 48 months. 
 Practicing Professionals: 
o Direct Accession (DA): Practicing physicians can receive a  
sign-on bonus of between $220,000 and $400,000; this is based on 
the individual’s specialty and service requirement. 
2. Medical Corps Special Pay System 
U.S. Navy medical providers have many types of pay and allowances that affect 
their total salary. Here are a list of the most common pay and allowances that affect a 
providers’ total salary according to the Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS) 
website: 
 Base Pay: All military personnel receive this pay based on rank and time 
in service. 
 Allowances: The most common allowances are BAS and BAH. All 
officers receive a set amount of BAS, which is solely based on being an 
officer or enlisted person. Conversely, all officers receive BAH, but it is 
determined by rank, location, and number of dependents (if any). 
Besides receiving their normal base pay and allowances, Medical Corps officers 
are entitled to many types of Special Pays. These Special Pays are intended to keep 
Medical Corps officers’ income comparable with their civilian counterparts and reduce 
the pay gap between military medical officers who meet specified criteria and their 
civilian specialist counterparts. The Special Pays awarded to the Medical Corps are: 
Incentive Special Pay (ISP), Additional Special Pay (ASP), Multiyear Specialty Pay 
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(MSP), Board Certified Pay (BCP), and Variable Special Pay (VSP). Some of these carry 
multiyear service agreements, and some only require annual commitments. These pays 
are in addition to Basic Pay, BAH, and BAS. Listed below is a brief description of each 
type of pay according to Navy’s OPNAVINST 7220.17, in 2005: 
 MSP: Annual payment amount for multiyear contracts, based on their 
specialty for which they are currently credentialed. 
 ISP: Annual payment based on their specialty for which they are currently 
credentialed and practicing. 
 VSP: Medical Officers on active duty who were ordered to active duty for 
a period of not less than one year at set amount. 
 ASP: Annual payment to Medical Corps Officers, who agree to remain on 
active duty not less than one year, who has a current, valid, and 
unrestricted license. 
 BCP: Annual Payment to Medical Corp Officers, who agree to remain on 
active duty not less than one year, who has a current, valid, unrestricted 
license and are board certified. 
3. Retention 
After the Medical Corps officer’s initial obligation is over, there are many factors 
that affect their retention. Some of the key factors that influence whether an individual 
will stay are pay and benefits. Currently, Navy medicine offers a variety of pay incentives 
that help keep Medical Corps officers in the Navy, such as the previously mentioned 
MSP, ISP, VSP, ASP, and BCP. The Navy uses these Special Pays to reduce the pay gap 
between military and civilian providers and also as an award to Medical Corps officers in 
designated specialties to support desired staffing levels by specialty. Even though the 
Navy offers these various types of Special Pays to mitigate the pay gap, the Navy is 
continually challenged in meeting its manning requirements. 
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C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
1. Retention in the Military 
a. Overview of Retention Models 
A vast body of empirical research focuses on military retention in order to 
define, examine, and evaluate factors that influence the retention behavior of military 
personnel. Typically, military retention research has been conducted in one of three ways: 
large-scale surveys and qualitative studies, multivariate regression models, or specific 
conceptual models of retention behaviors that were proposed on the basis of theories and 
which have been evaluated (Weiss et al., 2003).2 
 The purpose of large-scale survey research is to examine and descriptively 
analyze a number of factors that are related to military personnel retention and investigate 
how these factors influence or predict the stay-leave decision of military personnel. For 
example, a preliminary analysis of a 1999 United States Marine Corps (USMC) retention 
survey was used to provide a descriptive analysis of factors affecting the retention 
behavior of USMC personnel (Kocher & Thomas, 2000). Results of this survey indicate 
that the most influential factors related to Marines’ decisions to leave the service are 
military pay and civilian opportunities, while the factors most influencing Marines’ 
decisions to stay are their pride in the Corps and its values (Weiss et al., 2003). 
 Another common method used to study military retention is utilizing 
multivariate retention models. To pinpoint the influential factors of military retention, 
researchers have constructed multivariate retention models based on Adams Smith’s 
(1776) economic theory of occupational choice (Warner, 1978; Warner, 1979; Enns, 
Nelson, & Warner, 1984; Warner & Goldberg, 1984; Black, Hogan, & Sylwester, 1987; 
Gotz & McCall, 1980). The basic idea behind this theory is that rational individuals make 
their occupational choices based on a utility maximization concept. Military personnel 
maximize their utilities by making decisions either to stay in the military or leave and 
pursue civilian opportunities. This is often a function of pecuniary and nonpecuniary 
factors (Weiss et al., 2003). 
                                                 
2 Bristol (2006) referred to Weiss et al. (2003) classification of military retention’s empirical research 
in his study of the effect of operational tempo on the retention of Navy medical officers. 
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 The final method of studying military retention takes a slightly different 
approach. In this method, retention is examined through the proposal and empirical 
evaluation of specific conceptual models of military retention behavior (Weiss et al., 
2003). For instance, Kerr (1997) proposed that reenlistment is a function of civilian job 
opportunities, cognitive satisfaction with military life, military experience, and an 
individual’s demographics and personal characteristics. In order to evaluate the model 
empirically, Kerr divided the sample into four groups, based on gender and term of 
enlistment, then analyzed each group separately. Kerr (1997) finds that, although many of 
the proposed factors were significant predictors of retention behavior, none of them were 
statistically significant across all four groups. Therefore, the reasons behind Marines’ 
decisions to leave the military at their first and second decision points were somewhat 
different between males and females (Weiss et al., 2003). 
b. Empirical Evidence of Military Retention 
 Enlisted personnel retention studies mostly focus on first- and second-term 
reenlistment. Early studies (1975–1990) indicated that reenlistment elasticity, with 
respect to the military pay, fell between 1.0 and 2.5 with a few higher and lower 
estimates (Goldberg & Warner,1982; Warner & Goldberg, 1984; Hosek & Peterson, 
1985; Daula & Moffitt, 1989; Cooke, Marcus, & Quester, 1992; Smith, Sylwester, & 
Villa, 1990; Shiells & McMahon, 1993; Warner & Solon, 1991), while recent studies 
showed a lower reenlistment pay elasticity (i.e., 0.5–1.5) (Mackin, Darling, Mackie, & 
Mairs, 1996; Mackin,1996).3 On the other hand, officers’ retention studies generally 
focus on retention at the end of the initial obligation of service date and the time of 
promotion to O-4. On the whole, officers’ pay elasticity falls between 0.8 and 1.5 (Asch, 
Hosek, & Warner, 2007). 
 The variation in reenlistment-pay elasticity estimates obtained in prior 
literatures raises questions about whether the pay elasticity has changed over time or 
variations in the elasticity estimates can be attributed to other factors. Hansen and 
                                                 
3The enlisted pay elasticity estimates from various studies, including those mentioned here, and 
additional studies of officers’ retention were brilliantly summarized by Warner and Asch (1995), Goldberg 
(2001), and Asch et al. (2007). 
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Wenger (2002) find that there has been very little variation in the pay elasticity over time 
and that the only significant variation happened at the beginning and end of the 
drawdown era. They affirm that most of the estimated variation found in prior literature 
results from different specifications in the empirical models used by researchers. 
To come up with this conclusion, Hansen and Wenger (2002) construct a 
logit model to examine the relationship between relative compensation and first-term 
reenlistment of Navy enlisted personnel, using data on male sailors who were eligible for 
reenlistment during the period FY1987-FY1999. Their baseline model estimates a pay 
elasticity of 1.5 and a one-level increase in the selective reenlistment bonus (SRB) 
multiplier generates a 2.5 percentage point increase in reenlistment. On the other hand, 
when they use different model specifications on the same dataset, the pay elasticity 
estimates ranged from 0.4 to 2.9 and a similar variation in the effect of the SRB on 
retention was observed. The difference in elasticity estimates did not reflect a change in 
sailors’ reenlistment behavior, but rather a difference in model specifications that 
attributes to the elasticity variation. Hansen and Wenger (2002) find that there is very 
little variation in pay elasticity from FY1987 through FY1999, and the only significant 
variation happened at the beginning and the end of the drawdown. The variation in 
elasticities due to different model specification, however, is much higher than the 
variation observed over time (Hansen &Wenger, 2002). 
2. Military Physicians’ Retention 
It is costly to recruit and train healthcare specialists. In addition, due to the limited 
supply of physicians, the civilian sector competes to attract the skilled and experienced 
military physicians by offering higher compensation and better job stability, especially 
since their skills are easily transferable. This contributes to high rates of attrition among 
unobligated, fully trained specialists and puts a stress on military personnel planning to 
retain them. 
Since financial factors, such as compensation and bonuses, have a significant 
influence on physicians’ decisions to stay or leave the military, the vast body of empirical 
research has focused on the effect of the civilian-military pay gap on uniformed 
physicians’ retention. Yet, some other studies have examined how physicians’ retention 
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behavior is influenced by nonpecuniary factors such as work conditions, job satisfaction, 
family adaptation, and operational tempo. 
The study that most closely follows our research was conducted by  
McMahon, May, Graham, & Dolfini (1989). They analyze the role of the civilian-military 
pay differential and its influence on Navy physicians’ retention. Their study focuses on 
the first decision point of fully trained, unobligated physicians in 22 specialties, who 
were on active duty from FY1983 to FY1987. Data on physicians’ military 
compensation, along with their background and personal characteristics, were gathered 
from the Bureau of Medicine Information System (BUMIS), while alternative civilian 
pay information was provided by the Association of American Medical Colleges 
(AAMC). Their premier descriptive data analysis indicated a positive and growing 
civilian-military pay gap, with an average of $25,000, and ranged from $1,200 for 
pediatricians to $117,200 for thoracic and cardiovascular surgeons. In addition, the 
retention of fully trained, unobligated specialists decreased from 47% in FY1984 to 34% 
in FY1987. The authors utilized a logistic regression model to estimate the effect of 
civilian-military pay differential on the probability that a specialist would leave the Navy, 
and then constructed elasticities of attrition probability, with respect to changes in the pay 
differential, for 22 specialties. Other factors were controlled in order to obtain an 
unbiased estimate of the effect of the pay gap on attrition. These factors include types of 
accession and personal characteristics such as minority status, number of dependents, 
Year of Service (YOS) toward retirement, and taste of military life. The logit model’s 
results indicated an aggregate elasticity of 0.15 and a high elasticity of attrition, with 
respect to the pay deferential for thoracic and cardiovascular surgeons and for 
neurosurgeons (0.71 and 0.72, respectively), and a low elasticity of attrition for 
pediatricians and family practitioners. These results explain why specialists with large 
pay differentials show the greatest retention responsiveness for specific reduction in the 
pay gap. 
Accordingly, McMahon et al. (1989) proposed three alternative pay plans for the 
Navy to retain its experienced and skilled healthcare professionals. Table 1 summarizes 
the outcome of each alternative plan as well as an evaluation of each one. The authors 
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implicitly recommend Plan III, which pays all fully trained, unobligated physicians 90% 
of their alternative civilian median outcome. The reasons that promote this option, 
besides its competitive cost, are that it is simple and can be easily adjusted as civilian 
alternative pay changes. Also, Plan III may prevent future distortion in the civilian-
military pay gap and consequent retention problems (McMahon et al., 1989). 
Table 1.   Evaluation of Alternative Pay Plans. 
Plan Raise Coverage Cost ($M) 
Retention 
(%) Evaluation 
I Pay 48% cost-of-
living adjustment to 
all specialty pays. 
All 
physicians 
15.2 23 Does not address targeted 
specialties, which still suffer a high 
civilian-military pay gap. Some 
specialties would be paid more than 
the civilian median. 
II Pay alternative 
civilian median if 
FY1988 inventory is 







13.8 38 Does not address specialties with 
high gap and low retention. Bonuses 
vary with time. So, long-term 
discounting cannot be done due to 
uncertainty. Does not account for 
cost-of-living adjustment. 







13.7 38 Does not waste money by 
overcompensating. Perceived as fair 
by all physicians. Pay may increase 
for specialties that have no retention 
problem. Creates a variation in pay 
across specialties. 
 
It is worth mentioning that McMahon et al. (1989) find that the elasticity 
estimates could underestimate the retention behavior, since there is a small variation in 
military pay within specialties and it would have been better if data were collected over a 
longer period of time. In addition, the model specifications used in the study could suffer 
from omitted variables biasness, since physicians’ dissatisfaction with regard to work 
conditions and military supervision is not included. The authors indicate, however, that 
this effect across all physicians should not lead to any bias in the predictive value or the 
interpretation of the model. 
Lane and Melody (1998) study the change in Navy specialists’ retention as a 
result of healthcare reform and the accelerated movement toward managed care in 1992. 
The managed care environment had shifted the demand away from certain specialties and 
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toward primary care practicing, which resulted in an increase in civilian earnings for 
primary care physicians and a decrease in earnings for some other specialties. To 
examine the sensitivity of Navy specialists to changes in the relative size of the pay 
differential, Lane and Melody (1998) constructed a logistic regression model based on 
pooled, cross-sectional data of Navy specialists who were reaching their initial decision 
point or subsequent decision points from FY1992 through FY1996. This data were 
obtained from the Health Manpower Personnel Data System (HMPDS), which was 
provided by Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC), while their civilian counterparts’ 
compensation data were obtained from the AAMC and Hay group surveys. Using a logit 
model, they estimate the probability that an unobligated, fully trained physician will stay 
in the Navy as a function of civilian-military pay differential (primary factor), personal 
demographics, rank, YOS, accession sources, and a taste for Navy life. 
Lane and Melody’s (1998) preliminary descriptive analysis shows an overall 
positive and growing difference between civilian and military pay. This difference 
increases with years of experience for all specialties and was higher for specialists who 
required an extensive training. As of 1996, the average military/civilian pay ratio for all 
specialties was reduced to 0.66, compared to the 0.79 obtained by McMahon et al. (1989) 
earlier, in 1988. Lane and Melody (1998) estimate an aggregate retention-pay elasticity of 
0.23 using AAMC data, compared to 0.15 estimated by McMahon et al. (1989) in 1988. 
Primary care physicians show a higher sensitivity to pay in recent years, indicating that 
managed care had shifted the retention responsiveness of primary physicians, which 
dropped from 80% in the 1980s to 65% in the late 1990s. The overall estimates from the 
logit model, using Hay group data, show less sensitivity than the one using AAMC data. 
One explanation for the difference is that Hay group data display a higher variation in 
pay differentials among specialists. 
Previous studies examining the rate of retention for Navy physicians show that the 
rate of retention is declining for some specialties. These studies, however, only focus on 
the “total pool of un-obligated physician specialties” (Christensen, Brannman, 
Almendarez, Sanders, & Kimble, 2002, p. 1). This overemphasizes physicians who might 
not be committed to staying in the Navy. As a result, a historical overview and retention 
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analysis on Navy specialty physicians from FY1987 to FY2000 was conducted by 
Christensen et al. (2002) to identify and track critical indicators that predict the trends of 
the Navy Medical Corps’ work force, as a whole, as well as for each individual specialty. 
They compare these trends to the civilian sector to assess if notable changes were unique 
for the Navy. In particular, this will provide insight into whether the Navy cannot fill its 
specialty physicians’ billets or if there is an insufficient physician in the pipeline. 
Given these critical indicators, the historical overview of all Navy physicians 
indicates a reduction of 7% in the total inventory from FY1987 through FY2000. Despite 
this downtrend, the number of fully trained specialists and executive medical officers 
increased by 29%, which implies an increase in the Navy’s ability to fill its billets during 
that period. This suggests that the downtrend came from a reduction in the number of 
physicians in the pipeline, which signals a shortage of physicians to fill these billets in the 
future. When Christensen et al. (2002) analyze the distribution of specialties by category, 
they find that as of FY2000, 43% of all physicians were in primary care specialties, while 
surgical and other specialties accounted for 26% and 31%, respectively. Comparing this 
distribution mix with the civilian sector shows a similar pattern. These changes in 
specialty mix, with a higher percentage of primary care specialties and lower percentage 
of surgeons in both the Navy and the civilian sector, indicate a national movement 
towards managed care. This conclusion supports the finding of Lane and Melody (1998). 
Besides observing force structure critical indexes to measure the historical 
behavior of Navy physicians’ inventories, Christensen et al. (2002) evaluate the retention 
of the Navy Medical Corps based on the matriculation rate of new accessions into the 
specialty pool and the attrition rate of fully trained specialists out of the pool. To examine 
the matriculation rate, Christensen et al. (2002) evaluate the three predominant accession 
sources: Armed Forces Health Professions Scholarship Program (AFHPSP) direct 
accessions, AFHPSP fully deferment accessions, and USUHS accessions. They find that 
the percentage of AFHPSP direct accessions who became residents before 1988 is 14% 
higher than those who joined the residency program afterward. Furthermore, after 1988, 
the accumulative retention rate of AFHPSP direct accessions who became fully trained 
specialists two years after ADO completion is 7% higher than the retention rate before 
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1988. These changes in retention patterns are referred to a policy change in the obligation 
service associated with residency training.4 The evaluation of the matriculation rate for 
USUHS did not reflect such effects of the obligated policy change because USUHS 
accessions have seven years of initial obligation service compared to four years for 
AFHPSP direct accessions. Similarly, the policy change has no effect on fully deferred 
AFHPSP accessions, since they joined the service as fully trained specialists. A 1988 
policy change, however, may increase their obligation service by one year, if they decide 
to join a fellowship program after 1988. 
With regard to the attrition rate of fully trained specialists out of the specialty 
pool, Christensen et al. (2002) examine three specialty groups: primary care, surgical 
specialties, and other specialties. They find that primary care specialists’ attrition rate was 
not statistically different before or after the obligation service change in 1988 and their 
average attrition rate at one, two, three, and four years after completing the ADO are 
50%, 55%, 60%, and 63%, respectively. For surgeons, the overall attrition has declined 
from 59% before the policy change to 44% after 1988. Similarly, other specialties’ 
cumulative attrition rate had been reduced from 54% to 38% after 1988. 
Brannman et al. (2002) analyze the retention behavior for Army, Navy, and  
Air Force (AF) military physicians from FY1991 to FY1998, as a part of their report to 
Congress regarding health professionals’ retention-accession incentives. They examine 
attrition and continuation rates5 for 23 specialties and construct a duration model to study 
the survival of military physicians within these specialties. They use DMDC data that 
contains information on demographics and personal information of all military physicians 
from FY1991 to FY1998, as well as information on their military compensation. Hay 
group’s data are used as well to obtain information on civilian-sector compensation for 
each specialty during the same period. 
                                                 
4 Before April 1988, in-house residents were obligated neutral with a minimum of two YOS required 
upon the completion of the residency program, while after April 1988 in-house residents were obligated to 
serve years-for-year of residency training, which is served concurrently with any existing obligation. 
5 The continuation rate was examined by a percentage of physicians who were on active duty as of the 
beginning of a given FY and were in uniform in subsequent years. 
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Brannman et al. (2002) find that an aggregate attrition rate for fully trained, 
unobligated specialists had increased slightly over time. This change, however, was not 
statistically significant. Similarly, the aggregate continuation rate did not change 
significantly over time. It was surprising that the attrition/continuation rates had not 
changed significantly during the 1990s, given the existing wide gap between military and 
civilian compensation for all of the 23 specialties. Brannman et al. (2002) indicate that 
the civilian-military pay gap could have had a little effect on attrition or it might have had 
increased the attrition, but this increase was offset by other factors. Another explanation 
is that the attrition varied across specialties. If specialties with lower attrition make up a 
great portion of the total inventory, they will make the overall increase in attrition across 
all specialties. Moreover, changes in civilian pay and healthcare system practices could 
affect military physicians’ attrition negatively, despite the wide gap in civilian-military 
pay. 
With respect to the duration model of military physicians during the 1990s, 
Brannman et al. (2002) examine the influence of the civilian-military pay gap on the 
probability of a physician to attrite at any given point in time (t), given that he/she has 
been unobligated for a defined period of time leading up to (t). This is commonly known 
in the literature as the Hazard Ratio of attrition. Brannman et al. (2002) estimate an 
aggregate duration model and separate models for three specialty groups: primary care 
specialties, surgical specialties, and other specialties. 
The results of the duration model, with respect to the civilian-military pay gap 
effect on retention of military specialists, indicate that, on average, military physicians 
are modestly sensitive to pay differential changes and the average career length elasticity 
is 0.25. Detailed effects by specialty show that the pay differential has no significant 
effect on the career length of primary care specialists. This indicates that primary care 
physicians decide to stay or leave based on factors other than financial aspects. 
Furthermore, the pay gap has a significant, but weak, negative effect on surgeons’ career 
length, with elasticity of 0.32. Similarly, there is a negative and significant effect of 
civilian-military pay differential on the career length for anesthesiologists, radiologists, 
pathologists, and psychiatrists, with elasticity ranges from 0.3 to 0.65. Moreover, a strong 
 19
and negative relationship is found between the pay differential and the career length of 
internal medicine specialists, with an elasticity of 1.25. In addition, gender has no effect 
on specialists’ career length, while physicians who are closer to retirement exhibit a 
longer career length for most specialties. 
3. The Effect of Operational Tempo on Military Healthcare 
Professionals’ Retention 
The main focus of this study is to investigate the effect of the civilian-military pay 
gap on Navy Medical Corps retention; however, we also explore the influence of 
OPTEMPO on the retention of Navy physicians to answer one of the secondary questions 
of this thesis, which seeks to estimate the effect of the protracted GWOT on Navy’s 
physicians’ retention, given the long span of the GWOT over the last decade. Therefore, 
despite the fact that they are extremely limited, it is worth recalling prior research on the 
effect of OPTEMPO on the retention of military caregivers. 
Pierre (2005) examines the impact of increased OPTEMPO, influenced by the 
tragedy of 9/11, on Navy hospital corpsmen’s retention. She applies logistic regression 
models on two datasets: one for all Navy hospital corpsmen who were on active duty on 
September 1, 1998 and became eligible for reenlistment before September 11, 2001, and 
the other consists of all hospital corpsmen that were on active duty after September 11, 
2001 and became eligible to reenlist before March 31, 2004. She then compares the 
results to investigate the effect of increased OPTEMPO, imposed by the GWOT after 
9/11, on the retention of hospital corpsmen. Her findings indicate that deployment has a 
positive effect on the retention of Navy hospital corpsmen. In addition, she finds that the 
retention rate increases by 20% for those who joined the Navy after September 11, 2001, 
relative to the retention rate of the 1998 group. 
Bristol (2006) studies the influence of increased OPTEMPO on Navy Medical 
Corps retention. He obtains data for two distinct cohorts: a cohort of all active duty 
physicians who were serving in the Navy on October 1, 1999, and all active duty 
physicians serving in the Navy on October 1, 2002. Bristol (2006) implements a 
difference-in-difference estimator in his logistic regression models to compare the change 
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in retention behavior of nondeployers who were not affected by the increase in 
OPTEMPO, with the change in retention behavior of deployers who were affected by the 
increased OPTEMPO. Bristol (2006) finds that increased OPTEMPO has a negative 
effect on GMO retention. A GMO who was deployed after the OPTEMPO had increased 
(2002 cohort) has a retention probability of 9.59 percentage points lower than 
nondeployers before the increased OPTEMPO. Similarly, a specialist who was deployed 
after the increased OPTEMPO has a retention probability of 14.81 percentage points 
lower than a nondeployer specialist in the 1999 cohort. 
Dietrich (2007) examines the effect of the GWOT/OPTEMPO on the retention 
behavior of the Navy Medical Service Corps (MSC) who were on active duty from 1997 
through 2005. He employed logistic regression models that incorporate difference-in-
difference estimators to measure the effect of increased OPTEMPO imposed by GWOT 
on the first-term retention of unobligated Navy MSC. Dietrich (2007) finds that MSCs 
who served in 2001 had a lower probability to stay in the Navy by approximately 
9% than those who served in 1998 and 1999. Furthermore, his results show that, in 
general, deployment has a positive and statistically significant effect on MSC members’ 
probability of staying for a second-term obligation. An MSC officer who was deployed 
has an increased probability to stay by 5.1%. If he/she had at least one hostile 
deployment, his/her retention probability increases by 7.7%. On the other hand, 
difference-in-difference estimators indicate that there was no statistical difference 
between the effect of deployment in the post-GWOT period and its effect in the pre-
GWOT period on MSC members’ retention. Therefore, Dietrich (2007) suggests that 
there are other important factors that have not been controlled for such as fear of 
deployment, deployment uncertainty, increased stress and workload imposed on 
nondeployers as a result of deployments, or better civilian opportunities for MSC 
members who served in 2001, could have caused the decreased retention rate of the MSC. 
The findings of previous studies confirmed that military medical care 
professionals showed a higher rate of retention in the early stage of the GWOT (Pierre, 
2005; Dietrich, 2007). This increase in retention is attributed to an increase in patriotism,  
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which led to a commitment for staying on active duty to protect the nation (Pierre, 2005). 
The increased OPTEMPO, however, had a negative effect on retention, especially after 
FY2002 (Bristol, 2006). 
A lot has changed during the past decade. The nation fought two wars that lasted 
until the end of 2011. The economy was booming during the first half of the decade, but 
since the real estate and stock market bubble burst in 2008, the economy has shrunk and 
the United States is still quarrying out from the debris of the collapse of the financial 
system. All of these factors certainly have an impact on the health care market, especially 
the supply and demand of fully trained physicians. Unobligated military specialists opt to 
stay in the service or leave and join the civilian sector. They make their decisions based 
on many influences, but, most importantly, based on financial factors. This study sheds a 
light on the retention of fully trained, unobligated Navy Medical Corps personnel during 
the last decade. This thesis is a continuation of prior research that examines the effect of 
the civilian-military pay gap on the retention of the Navy’s physicians. It also updates the 
retention elasticity for the overall Medical Corps and 19 medical specialties. 
Furthermore, this study estimates the projected retention rates for Navy Medical Corps. 
In addition, it evaluates how the protracted GWOT affected the retention behavior of 
Navy medical specialists during the past decade. 
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III. DATA SOURCES AND PRELIMINARY DATA ANALYSIS 
A. DATA SOURCES 
1. Bureau of Medicine and Surgery (BUMED) 
The BUMIS is considered the most reliable data source for Navy medicine. 
BUMIS data contains records of all individuals in the U.S. Navy Medical Corps. We 
obtained this data from BUMED, for FY2001 through FY2011, in order to perform our 
study. The BUMIS dataset includes observations of all Navy physicians from FY2001 
through FY2011. The BUMIS data provides general demographic information, source of 
commission, obligated service date, medical subspecialty, rank, and Special Pays (except 
VSP). The BUMIS data do not contain any information on marital status or dependents 
and/or information regarding the amount of RMC each provider received. It does, 
however, contain the data to compute what the providers’ RMC would be. 
The data set for our sample contains a total of 48,000 observations for the sample 
years between FY2001 and FY2011. The sample size was reduced from its original size 
to 4960 observations in order to create a more manageable work file. We eliminate the 
variables for General Medical Officer (GMO) and attrite before completion of obligation 
service. Furthermore, we do not have information on those who stayed in the Navy in 
FY2000 and who left in FY2001, we only observe the physicians who became 
unobligated and stayed in the Navy during FY2001. Due to this constraint, all 
observations of FY2001 were deleted and the analyses are conducted for the years 
FY2002 through FY2011. 
While the BUMIS data does contain information on providers who received ISP 
and MSP each FY, the data does not reflect the true decision point to stay in or leave the 
Navy. This is because if some physicians left mid FY then the data would not reflect that 
individual receiving ISP and MSP. Therefore, we manually created a database from 
BUMED’s website, which shows how much each provider receives for every FY. The 
BUMIS data does not include a YOS variable; however, we construct one in our file by 
using the Active Duty Base Date (ADBD) variable that the BUMIS data provides. 
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2. Regular Military Compensation/Special Pay 
In order to compensate for these deficiencies, we have manually created a 
database from the DFAS website that shows what the base pay and BAS would be from 
FY2002 through FY2011. We created a database for pay grades O-3 through O-5, from 0 
years of service to 40 years. Pay grades for O-1, O-2, and O-7 and above were not 
included because at pay grades O-1 and O-2 the physicians are still in obligation status, 
and pay grades O-7 and above are in executive medicine positions and, therefore, not 
doing any clinical work since they are in executive leadership positions. 
The BAH is based on Unit Identification Code (UIC), rank, and with/without 
dependents status. To create a BAH table for FY2002 through FY2011, we used the 
historical FY2002 through FY2011 data from the Defense Travel website (Defense 
Travel Management Office, 2013). The BAH was estimated using service-wide UIC 
averages based on rank and the assumption that the provider is in “with dependent” 
status. 
Medical Corps officers are entitled to many Special Pays. The ISP and the MSP 
are Special Pays specifically designed to allow the U.S. Navy to assist in alleviating 
specific shortages and retain medical officers in specific specialties. Appendix A gives a 
breakdown of what the ISP and MSP are for each specialty by FY. 
3. Civilian Pay File 
The civilian physician compensation data for FY2001 through FY2011 was 
obtained from Medical Group Management Association (MGMA) Physician 
Compensation and Production Surveys. For FY2001 through FY2011, MGMA surveyed 
medical practices to obtain recent physician compensation data. They sent out 31,549 
surveys to obtain physician compensation for the various physician specialties and 
aggregated the responses to create an average pay for each specialty in the civilian sector. 
The civilian compensation total represents the physician’s gross income, before taxes. 
B. OBLIGATION 
 The U.S. Navy has many accession programs to encourage an individual to 
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become a U.S. Navy medical provider. The accession source and training pipelines that 
the individual selects will determine their length of obligation. Using only the BUMIS 
data to determine someone’s end of obligation is very difficult. Based on the data, we 
were unable to precisely determine someone’s end of service obligation. This was due to 
inconsistent BUMIS data and/or it was unclear whether the provider is serving his/her 
initial obligation or serving another obligation that the provider incurred through some 
other source. We were able to resolve some of these issues by looking at the individual’s 
obligated service date (OSD) variable and creating a longitudinal database.6 With this 
database, we are able to look at retention of physicians under both their initial and their 
subsequent obligation. 
C. PRELIMINARY DATA ANALYSIS 
Our study will examine how changes in the civilian-military pay gap affects the 
decision of unobligated Navy physicians to stay in or leave the Navy at their next 
decision point across all specialties for the years between FY2002 and FY2011. We will 
not only look at the initial decision point, but we will also examine the behavior of Navy 
physicians for subsequent annual decision points. This section will summarize the data 
used for the model and provide a preliminary data analysis prior to presenting the 
empirical methodology. 
After combining the three data files, and eliminating all missing values, the final 
sample consists of 4,960 observations. Table 2 presents the number of providers that 
were unobligated and eligible to make retention decisions for FY2002 through FY2011. 
This table shows that the overall number of personnel who decided to stay at each 




                                                 
6 Lane and Melody (1998) encountered similar challenges with BUMIS data. Accordingly, they 
conducted their analyses for the initial and subsequent decision points. 
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Table 2.   Number of Unobligated Providers at a Decision Point to Leave the Navy by FY. 
Fiscal Year 
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Total
N= 634 642 726 633 534 475 377 331 324 284 4,960
Stayers= 453 484 563 449 329 303 207 200 174 164 3,326
 
Table 3 provides summary statistics for the demographic variables as well as the 
average retention rate and civilian-military pay gap for the entire sample period. The 
overall retention rate for the unobligated providers at a decision point to leave the Navy is 
67%, with the civilian-military pay gap at an average of $98,787.41. The majority of 
personnel making these decisions is, on average, 39-years old, male, white, Lieutenant 
Commander (LCDR), and has been in the Navy for approximately 10.9 years. 
Table 3.   General Data Description. 

















Figure 1 illustrates changes in the Medical Corps retention rate in relationship to 
the civilian-military pay gap over time. The figure indicates that the Medical Corps 
retention rate has been on a downward trend, whereas the civilian-military pay gap has 
steadily increased. This provides anecdotal evidence that reduced retention of Navy 
physicians over time is partly explained by increased salary in the civilian sector. 
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Figure 1.  Medical Corps (MC) Retention Rate vs. Civilian-Military Pay Gap. 
Overall, the civilian-military pay gap, on average, has increased 34% in the last 
nine years, growing from $81,807.40 to $123,950.60. One explanation for the increase in 
the pay gap is the rising health care costs in the United States. The rising health care costs 
can be attributed to a large extent, to the shrinking workforce, emerging technology, and 
changing reimbursement structures (Lanser, 2003). This may suggest that due to the 
insufficient supply of physicians, the civilian providers were able to receive an increase 
in pay. 
1. Data Description 
Table 4 provides a detailed7 description of the provider demographics for the first 
and last year of our sample. Frequency distributions and descriptive statistics are 
presented to illustrate changes in the characteristics of the sample over time in an effort to 
better understand the factors that influence a physician decision to stay or leave the Navy. 
  
                                                 
7 Subspecialties and FY were included in our model; however, for purposes of space, we did not 
include those variables in our table. 
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Table 4.   Data Description of the Demographics Variables used in the Model. 
Characteristics FY2002 (N= 610) FY2011 (N= 261) % Change Between FY2002 and FY2011 
Mean STD. DEV Mean STD. DEV
Gender (%) 
Male 73.50 72.80 –0.70
Female 26.55 44.20 27.20 44.59 0.65
Race (%) 
White 77.70 41.66 78.92 40.87 1.22
Black 2.62 15.99 5.75 23.32 3.13
Asian 3.44 18.25 9.96 30.00 6.52
Other 14.26 34.99 2.68 16.19 –11.58
Hispanic 1.97 13.90 2.68 16.19 0.71
Rank (%) 
CAPT 5.57 22.96 10.34 30.51 4.77
CDR 9.50 29.36 20.69 40.59 11.19
LCDR 70.33 45.72 67.05 47.09 –3.28
LT 14.59 35.33 1.92 13.73 –12.67
Accession Source (%) 
AFHPS_DEF 23.93 42.70 23.75 42.64 –0.18
AFHPS 66.23 47.33 62.07 48.61 –4.16
USUHS 9.83 29.80 11.11 31.49 1.28
FAP 0 0 3.07 17.27 3.07
Years of Service & Age 
YOS 9.23 5.50 12.32 6.74 3.09
AGE 37.50 5.43 41.03 6.54 3.53
 
Table 4 suggests that there is negligible change in the gender composition over 
time for Medical Corps officers in the Navy, though ethnic diversification has increased 
in the White, Black, Asian, and Hispanic categories. The table further suggests that the 
number of senior officers making decisions to stay in or leave the Navy has increased by: 
Captain (CAPT)/4.77% and Commander (CDR)/11.19%; however, the number of junior 
officers doing so has decreased: LCDR/–3.28% and Lieutenant (LT)/–12.67%. This may 
explain why the average age (+3.53) and YOS (+3.09) have also increased over the 
sample period. With respect to the accession source, the number of Medical Corps 
officers retained increases the most with USUHS relative to the other accession sources. 
Figure 2 shows changes in the Navy Medical Corps’ retention rates from FY2002 
to FY2011 in relation to the Medical Corps ISP and MSP. This graph shows that the 
 29
Medical Corps’ retention rate has steadily decreased since 2004, and it appears that a 
drop in retention rate does not translate to an increase in Special Pays during the 
following year. 
 
Figure 2.  Medical Corps’ (MC) Retention Rate vs. ISP/MSP Bonus Pay. 
Figure 2 illustrates that the concern about reverse causality, whereby a drop in 
retention rate in t-1 year causes an increase in special bonus in year t, is likely minimal in 
our study. The Navy sets bonus pay based on end-strength quotas; however, Navy 
officers make a decision to stay based partly on the amount of the bonus pay. Using 
methods consistent with a prior study (Brannman et al., 2002), we do not believe this 
endogeniety issue will bias our elasticity estimates. In our study, however, we do see that 
retention is trending downward between FY2007 and FY2008, followed by an increase in 
bonus between FY20088 and FY2009, which would be consistent with the reverse 
causality effect. Likewise, a drop in retention between FY2004 and FY2005 is followed 
by increase in bonuses between FY2005-FY2006. This is counterintuitive, since previous 
studies have shown an increase in the U.S. Navy’s retention rate during this time frame. 
This suggests that the Medical Corps’ retention rates and Navy-wide retention rates are 
differentially affected across the nine years of our study. 
                                                 
8 According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, the U.S. economy started its recession in  
December 2007. 
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The highest retention rate was in FY2004, which was a year after the GWOT 
started. This can be explained by a high acceptance rate of U.S. involvement in the 
GWOT among U.S. citizens. 
2. Civilian-Military Pay Gap Among Specialists 
Between the years FY2002 and FY2011, there were 4,960 providers who were 
able make a decision to stay in or leave Navy. Table 5 shows the aggregate number of 
officers in each specialty that were at a decision point for the years between FY2002 and 
FY2011. The Primary Care Service Provider compromises the largest number of officers 
(37.35%) who potentially might leave. They were followed by other specialties at 
36.2% and then surgical at 26.4%. 
Table 5.   Decisions Makers in Specific Specialties. 
Specialty Frequency Percent 
Anesthesiology 368 8.22
General Surgery 219 4.89
Neurological Surgery 27 0.60
OB/GYN 349 7.79
Ophthalmology 96 2.14
Orthopedic Surgery 279 6.23
Otolaryngology 119 2.66
Urology 94 2.10
Occupational Medicine 94 2.10
Physical Rehabilitation 19 0.42
Pathology 119 2.66
Dermatology 147 3.28
Emergency Medicine 425 9.49
Family Practice 921 20.57





Total 4,478 100% 
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Table 6 presents the pay gap between civilian and military specialists, broken 
down by years of experience in their respective specialty. We have broken the categories 
down by the following years of experience: 2 years, 7 years, 17 years, and 18+ years. 
These benchmarks were selected because these are the years that were used in the  
civilian data. 
Table 6.   Average Civilian-Military Pay Gap by Years of Experience. 
2 Years 7 Years 17 Years 18+ Years 
Anesthesiology $153.067 $213.181 $217,895 $167,073
General Surgery $121,726 $169,860 $166,912 $131,982
Neurological Surgery $374,473 $442,960 $508,304 $404,430
OBGYN $77,217 $111,753 $111,314 $141,999
Ophthalmology $202.055 $136,429 $155,661 $130,711
Orthopedics Surgery $80,617 $291,931 $303,349 $203,544
Otolaryngology $131,392 $183,884 $175,240 $132,758
Urology $121,666 $187,835 $210,003 $144,656
Occupational Medicine $48,559 $48,559 $59,424 $26,898
Physical Rehab $47,978 $87,440 $87,857 $48,837
Pathology $52,455 $140,220 $181,582 $199,713
Dermatology $127,594 $198,799 $194,247 $177,446
Emergency Medicine $95,475 $102,127 $96,553 $75,495
Family Practice $30,217 $46,902 $42,633 $14,089
Internal Medicine $35,463 $51,874 $50,746 $18,440
Neurology $52,185 $91,728 $74,311 $56,371
Pediatrics $20,098 $42,200 $48,135 $16,890
Psychiatry $53,850 $66,382 $40,370 $11,027
Radiology $170,909 $287,913 $326,075 $274,173
 
Table 6 shows that military physicians across all specialties are underpaid 
compared to their civilian counterparts (i.e., all pay gaps are positive in the table) and that 
the Primary Care Service has the smallest military pay gap, compared to the other 
services. The Primary Care Service pay gap9 was approximately $37,570 dollars, whereas 
Surgical Specialties had a gap of $196,198 and other services had a gap of $130,908, on 
average. This table may suggest that Primary Care will have the highest retention rate 
                                                 
9 For a detailed breakdown, see Appendix A. We also did not take into account any tax benefits that 
BAH and BAS offers in this table. 
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because it has the lowest civilian-military pay gap. In addition, we can see that all the 
specialty pay gaps reach their peak at 17 years, and then the gap decreases thereafter. 
This can be explained by the fact that, in the military pay system’s structure, the 
providers pay increases every year until retirement. In the civilian sector, however, 
salaries generally plateau when certain years of work experience and milestones  
are reached. 
In summary, these tables and figures provide information that the civilian and 
military pay gap, across specialties, can have an effect on the retention rate of Medical 
Corps officers. There are other factors that can have an effect on retention such as 
working conditions, military lifestyle, and OPTEMPO. In Chapter IV, we will estimate 
how the pay gap will affect each specialty’s elasticity with regard to staying in the Navy, 
controlling for working conditions, military lifestyle, and OPTEMPO. 
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IV. GENERAL METHODOLOGY 
A. RETENTION ANALYSIS 
Multivariate regression analysis is used to estimate the retention probability of 
fully trained, unobligated Navy physicians. These models are incorporated with all 
possible influence variables in order to obtain unbiased estimates. Since the dependent 
variable (STAY) is a dichotomous, binary variable with value of (1) if a physician stays 
and (0) if he/she leaves, probit regression models are more appropriate to be used than 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) models. The greatest disadvantages of OLS models are, 
first, the fitted probability of stay or leave decisions can be less than zero or more than 
one, which makes no sense. Second, the partial effects of the explanatory variables are 
constant using OLS specification. Therefore, utilizing a probit binary response model is 
adequate to specify predictions that fall within 0–1 values. 
The sign of an explanatory variable’s parameter shows whether the variable is 
associated with an increased or decreased retention probability. The partial effect of any 
given explanatory variable indicates the magnitude of the change in the retention 
probability as a result of a change in that given explanatory variable and is evaluated 
using the representative person approach. The representative person approach defines a 
typical physician with a set of traditional characteristics to whom the partial effect is 
calculated. In this thesis, that reference physician is a White, male physician who 
accessed the Navy through the AFHPSP and holds the rank of commander. 
1. Multivariate Regression Models’ Specification 
a. Main Retention Model 
A multivariate probit regression model is constructed to estimate the 
aggregate retention probability for fully trained physicians who became unobligated from 
FY2002 through FY2011. The retention behavior is evaluated at initial and subsequent 
decision points. The main empirical probit model is shown in Equation (1): 
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Prob(Stay) =( β0 + β1CivMilGap + β2Demographic Variables + 
β3Military Experience Variables + β4Specialties’ Dummy Variables + 
β5Fiscal Years’ Dummy Variables + u)          (1) 
 Where: 
Prob(Stay) = Probability of staying in the Navy, given personal financial 
and background characteristics 
 = The standard normal cumulative distribution function 
CivMilGap = Pay gap between civilian alternative compensation and 
military compensation for a given FY = (civilian pay – military pay) 
Demographic variables include: 
female = Physician being a female (male is the reference category) 
Black = Physician being Black (White is the reference category) 
asian = Physician being Asian (White is the reference category) 
hispanic = Physician being Hispanic (White is the reference 
category) 
other = Physician being a race other than White, Black, Asian, or 
Hispanic (White is the reference category) 
age = Additional year of age 
age2 = Year of age squared 
Military experience variables include: 
lt = Physician currently holding the rank of lieutenant (commander 
is the reference category) 
lcdr = Physician currently holding the rank of lieutenant 
commander (commander is the reference category) 
cpt = Physician currently holding the rank of captain (commander 
is the reference category) 
YOS = An additional year of service 
YOS2 = Year of service squared 
USUHS = Physician accessed the Navy via USUHS (AFHPSP is 
the reference category) 
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AFHPSP_DEF = Physician accessed the Navy via AFHPSP-
deferred (AFHPSP is the reference category) 
FAP = Physician accessed the Navy via FAP (AFHPSP is the 
reference category) 
Specialties’ dummy variables = Physician practicing one of the 19 
specialties included in the model (Anesthesiology is the reference 
category) 
Fiscal years’ dummy variables = Dummy variables for FY2002 through 
FY2022 (FY2002 is the reference category) 
b. Specialty Groups Model 
Besides the main model, three additional probit regression models are 
estimated to examine effect of the pay gap on the retention of the three main groups of 
specialties: 
 Primary care specialties – family practice, internal medicine, pediatrics, 
and occupational medicine. 
 Surgical specialties – general surgery, neurological surgery, OB/GYN, 
ophthalmology, otolaryngology, orthopedic surgery, and urology. 
 Other specialties – anesthesiology, dermatology, emergency medicine, 
neurology, pathology, physical medicine, psychiatry, and radiology. 
The specification of specialty groups’ models is similar to that of the main 
model in Equation (1). The number of observations for each specialty group, however, is 
limited to those of physicians who belong to that group. 
c. Specialties-Specific Models 
In addition to the main model and specialty groups’ models, 19 probit 
models are built to evaluate the effect of the civilian-military pay gap on the retention 
behavior of each specialty physicians. The results of these models, in addition to the 
results of the main model and the specialty groups’ models, are used to obtain the overall 
elasticity estimate and the elasticity estimate of each individual specialty. 
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Due to the limited number of observation in some specialties, some of the 
explanatory variables predict the stay-leave decision perfectly. Therefore, the 
specification of specialties models is necessarily parsimonious compared to that of the 
main model and specialty groups’ models. Specialties models are specified as shown in 
Equation (2): 
Prob(Stay) =( β0 + B1 CivMilGap + β2female + β3Minority + β7lt_lcdr + 
β8YOS + β9YOS2 + β10age + β11age2  + β12None_AFHPSP + 
β13Post_2004+u)             (2) 
Where: 
Minority = Physician being nonwhite (White is the reference category) 
lt_lcdr = Physician currently holding the rank of lieutenant or lieutenant 
commander (commander or captain is the reference category) 
None AFHPSP = Physician accessed the Navy via any accession program 
other than the AFHPSP (AFHPSP is the reference category) 
Post_2004 = A dummy variable that controls for time. Since some yearly 
dummy variables perfectly predict stay-leave decisions for few specialties, 
(Post_2004) is incorporated in specialty models. It equals (1) for FY2005 
through FY2011, and (0) otherwise. 
d. Secondary Model 
One of the secondary questions of this study examines the effect of the 
protracted GWOT on retention. Therefore, a secondary probit model is constructed to 
examine the retention rate before and after FY2004. This point in time is selected 
because, first, we do not have data prior to FY2001 in order to examine the retention 
before and after the tragedy of 9/11. Moreover, by the end of FY2004, it has been three 
years since the commencement of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and almost 18 
months since Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) was initiated. Therefore, the long-term 
effect of the GWOT is expected to be observed after 3–4 years of continuous combat 
operations. This second model is identical to the first model in Equation (1), except the 
FY dummies are replaced with a Post_2004 dummy where: 
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Post_2004 = A dummy variable that equals (1) for FY2005 through 
FY2011, and (0) otherwise. 
To investigate whether a retention pattern varies systematically across 
specialty groups by the time or not, interactions between Post_2004 dummy and 
specialties’ group dummies are incorporated in the secondary model. In addition, an 
interaction between Post_2004 and female dummy variables is also included in the model 
to observe if the effect of the prolonged GWOT on retention differs across gender. 
2. Variable Definitions and Expected Effects 
a. Dependent Variable (STAY) 
The dependent variable is a binary variable that takes a value of (1) if a 
physician becomes unobligated at the beginning or during any given FY and decides to 
stay until the end of that FY. It also takes a value of (1) if he/she is observed as 
unobligated and decides to stay in the subsequent years that follow the year of his/her 
initial decision. The dependent variable is recorded as (0) for a physician who becomes 
unobligated at the beginning of or during any given FY and is not observed by the end of 
that FY. It also takes a value of (0) if a physician is not observed in any FY given that 
he/she was retained in the previous year. The end of active duty obligated service is 
obtained based on the OSD variable in the BUMED data. 
b. Explanatory Variables 
(1) Civilian-Military Pay Gap. Civilian-military pay gap 
(CivMilGap) is the variable of interest. Other explanatory variables are controlled for and 
incorporated in the regression models in order to obtain an unbiased estimate of the effect 
of the civilian-military pay deferential on physicians’ retention behavior. For each 
physician, in any given FY, the pay differential is calculated by summing the RMC (base 
pay, BAH, and BAS) and the Medical Corps’ Special Pays (ASP, BCP, VSP, ISP, and 
MSP) and then subtracting the total from the equivalent civilian compensation. The 
civilian compensation data is obtained from MGMA’s total physicians’ compensation 
surveys from 2002 through 2011. To control for the effect of outlier observations, the 
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median of the civilian compensation is used in the calculation. Nevertheless, for the 
purpose of sensitivity analyses, the mean of the civilian compensation is also 
incorporated into an auxiliary model to observe if there is a significant difference in the 
effect of the civilian-military pay gap on retention when using the mean of the civilian 
compensation, rather than its median. Each Navy physician in the dataset is assigned to a 
civilian-military pay gap value based on FY, type of specialty, and number of years spent 
practicing as fully trained specialist. To facilitate the interpretation and obtain a practical 
significance of the pay gap effect on retention, the civilian-military pay gap is 
incorporated in the models as increments of $1,000. 
It is expected that the pay gap will negatively affect the retention 
of unobligated, fully trained Navy physicians. The negative effect of the civilian-military 
pay gap is expected to be observed on the aggregate retention and on the retention 
probability of each individual specialty. 
(2) Demographic Variables. 
 Gender (male, female). Gender variable is a binary variable that is coded (1) if the 
physician is female and (0) otherwise. Male is the reference category in the regression 
models. Historically, females show a lower probability of retention than males. In 
modern societies, however, the responsibility of maintaining the family unit becomes 
less exclusive for females. Both parents share a solemn accountability to maintain the 
nature of the family unit. Therefore, it is expected that females are not statistically 
different than males with regard to their retention behavior. Moreover, it is also 
expected that females may have higher retention than males since the duty types and 
billets become less restrictive and the working conditions become more equitable for 
active duty female members, especially in the military medical field. 
 Race (White, Black, Asian, Hispanic, and Other). Race categories are included in 
the regression models as dichotomous variables. If a physician belongs to one of these 
mutually exclusive categories, he/she is coded with (1), or (0) otherwise. The 
reference category in the regression models is White. Since the emergence of the All 
Volunteer Force (AVF), the proportion of racial minorities has significantly increased 
in the armed forces. Additionally, the military becomes a fair racial employer, where 
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job opportunities and chances for career advancement are distributed based on quality 
and productivity regardless of one’s race or ethnicity. Therefore, compared to the 
civilian sector, minorities have a greater chance to progress in the military and may 
stay longer in the service than their White peers. Accordingly, the retention 
probability of nonwhite physicians is expected to be higher than that of White 
physicians in the aggregate model and in each specialty-specific model. 
 Age (age, and age2). Age is a continuous variable that represents a physician’s age at 
the decision point. At younger ages, individuals are more likely to separate and 
switch jobs, either by quitting if they find themselves unmatched with their current 
job or as a result of a layoff if the employer finds them unfit for the job or with the 
organization overall. Moreover, younger employees are mostly single and they can 
easily mobilize and migrate to a different geographic region to look for a better job or 
a higher wage. On the other hand, older employees have a better understanding with 
regard to their optimal job matches and they already made their decision to stay in 
their current jobs. Furthermore, older employees are more likely to be married and 
have families, which restrain their ability to mobilize and switch jobs. Instead, they 
value job and income stability and stay longer than their younger peers. Therefore, it 
is expected that age affects retention negatively for younger physicians and the 
opposite happens for older physicians. To control for the diminishing return of age on 
retention, the age of a physician at the decision point is squared and incorporated in 
the regression models as (age2) variable. 
(3) Military Experience Variables. 
 Years of service (YOS, and YOS2). A physician’s accumulated credible military 
years of service at the decision point is represented by a continuous variable named 
(YOS). As a physician’s YOS increases and he/she approaches retirement, they are 
more likely to stay up to 20 YOS in order to gain their retirement benefits. After 20 
YOS, however, physicians are more likely to leave and pursue civilian employment. 
Thus, one additional YOS is expected to have a positive effect on retention up to 20 
years; afterward, the effect is expected to invert and have a negative impact on 
retention behavior. A physician’s YOS at the decision point is squared and included 
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in the regression models as the (YOS2) variable in order to control for the diminishing 
return of YOS on retention. 
 Rank (lt, lcdr, cdr, and cpt). Navy physicians’ ranks are represented in the regression 
models with four binary variables: Lieutenant (lt), Lieutenant Commander (lcdr), 
Commander (cdr), and Captain (cpt). If a physician holds one of these ranks at the 
decision point, he/she is coded (1) for that given rank and (0) otherwise. The 
reference category in the regression models is Commander. The longer a physician 
stays in the Navy, the more likely he/she will be promoted, advanced, and earn higher 
pay. Therefore, it is expected that higher ranks are associated with a higher 
probability of retention. 
 Accession sources (AFHPSP, AFHPSP_DEF, USUHS, and FAP). Accession 
sources are incorporated in the models as four dichotomous variables: the AFHPSP 
(AFHPSP), the Deferred AFHPSP (AFHPSP_DEF), the USUHS (USUHS), and the 
FAP (FAP). The reference category is AFHPSP. Many USUHS graduates have prior 
military service and they generally join the Navy with seven years of ADO to pay 
back for their medical school subsidies. Compared with other accession programs, 
USUHS physicians carry the longest initial ADO. This long tie with military life 
makes USUHS specialists more likely to stay in the Navy than physicians who 
accessed the Navy via different programs. On the other hand, AFHPSP- and 
AFHPSP-deferred physicians have four years of ADO for their school subsidies. 
However, AFHPSPs obtain their residency in military medical centers and carry 
additional ADO for their military residency, while AFHPSP-deferred physicians join 
the Navy after completing their residency in a civilian medical facility. Accordingly, 
AFHPSP specialists are more accustomed to Navy life and more likely to stay longer 
than AFHPSP-deferred specialists. FAP physicians, on the other hand, access the 
Navy during their civilian residency program and are obligated year-by-year of their 
residency program length. They typically have an ADO of 3–4 years. As soon as they 




specialists since they have the least military life engagement. Thus, it is expected to 
observe a higher retention probability for USUHS specialists than that of the 
AFHPSP, while AFHPSP-deferred and FAP specialists are expected to have a lower 
retention probability than AFHPSP specialists. 
(4) Years Dummy Variables. The year in which the unobligated 
physicians had to make the decision is captured by the set of year dummy variables for 
FY2002 through FY2011. These year dummies control for unobservable secular trend in 
retention rates that are not related to differences in pay gap. FY2002 is the reference 
category. 
(5) Specialties Dummy Variables. Specialties’ dummy variables 
are included in the regression models to control for and eliminate the effect of each of the 
retention differences across specialties. Anesthesiology is the reference category for the 
main model as well as the other specialties group model. Family practice is the reference 
category for the primary care specialties group model, while general surgery is the 
reference category for the surgical group model. 
Table 7 shows a summary of all explanatory variables and their 
expected effect on physicians’ retention. 
Table 7.   Explanatory Variables and Expected Signs. 
Variable Name Variable Type Expected Sign 
Variable of Interest   
CivMilGap Continuous – 
Demographic   
Gender   
male Dichotomous Reference Category 
female Dichotomous + 
Race/Ethnicity   
white Dichotomous Reference Category 
black Dichotomous + 
hispanic Dichotomous + 
asian Dichotomous + 
other Dichotomous + 
Age   
age Continuous – 
age2 Continuous + 
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Variable Name Variable Type Expected Sign 
Military Experience   
Rank   
lt Dichotomous – 
lcdr Dichotomous – 
cdr Dichotomous Reference Category 
cpt Dichotomous + 
Years of Service   
YOS Continuous – 
YOS2 Continuous + 
Accession Source   
AFHPSP Dichotomous Reference Category 
AFHPSP_DEF Dichotomous – 
USUHS Dichotomous + 
FAP Dichotomous – 
 
B. PROJECTION ANALYTICAL METHODS 
Utilizing the Main probit regression model in Equation (1) to predict Navy 
Medical Corps’ future retention rates is the most appropriate method of projection. 
However, the absence of Medical Corps’ inventory data for FY2012 and beyond restrains 
the employment of the probit model to forecast future retention rates. The best alternative 
projection method is to implement univariate time-series models to estimate future 
retention rates based on the historical data. BUMED records Navy Medical Corps’ 
inventory on a yearly basis. Therefore, based on the dataset we have (FY2002 until 
FY2011), only 10 observations are available with regard to yearly retention rates. With 
such limited availability of historical data, time-series smoothing models are the adequate 
models to predict future retention rates. Smoothing models require stationary data to 
forecast; accordingly, the Autocorrelation and Partial Autocorrelation Functions (ACF, 
PACF) of retention rates are tested and they indicate that the aggregate retention rates, as 
well as the retention rates of each individual specialty for the past 10 years, show 
stationary patterns. Therefore, we are able to employ time-series smoothing models to 
forecast future retention rates since the stationary data condition is satisfied. 
Three techniques are utilized to predict the retention rates for FY2012: forecasting 
with the mean, forecasting with moving average, and exponential smoothing forecast. 
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The mean forecasting method predicts future retention rates based on the average of all 
historical retention rate data. The model used for projection based on the mean 
forecasting method is: 
ܨ௧ାଵ ൌ ሺ஺భା஺మା⋯ା஺೟	் ሻ, 
where 		ܨ௧ାଵ	= Forecast for time period (t+1) 
ܣଵି௧ = Data (observations) for periods 1 to t 
ܶ      = The total number of time periods. 
Forecasting with moving average predicts the future retention rates based on the 
average of past n observations instead of the average of all historical data. In this study, 
three periods moving average and four periods moving average are used. Forecasting 
with moving average models are: 
Ft+1=∑ At/ntt=1 , 
where At = Data (observation) for period t 
n  = The number of past observations. 
Exponential smoothing forecasting method predicts the future retention rates as a 
weighted average of the actual retention rates in period t, (t-1), (t-2), etc. The weight 
associated with a period’s actual retention rate decreases exponentially over time. The 
exponential smoothing forecasting model is: 
Ft+1=Ft+α  (At-Ft), 
where  At = Actual value for period t 
Ft = Forecasted value for period t 
α = A smoothing constant that has a value between (0) and (1). 
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The main focus of this study is to examine the effect of the civilian-military pay 
gap on the retention of the Navy’s unobligated, fully trained specialists. All other 
explanatory variables are controlled to obtain an unbiased estimator of the pay 
differential on physicians’ retention. A main probit regression model is constructed to 
measure the effect of the pay gap on the aggregate retention of the Navy’s specialists who 
become unobligated from FY2002 through FY2011. In addition, separate probit 
regression models are utilized to investigate the effect of the civilian-military pay gap on 
the retention for the three main specialty groups (primary care, surgical specialties, and 
other specialties) and for 19 individual specialties. The results of the regression models 
are reported and discussed in this chapter. The partial effect of the pay differential is used 
to calculate the overall retention elasticity and the elasticity estimates of each specialty. 
A secondary question of this study seeks to understand the effect of the protracted 
GWOT on the retention behavior of the Navy’s Medical Corps. Therefore, a secondary 
probit regression model is constructed to evaluate the effect of that prolonged conflict on 
the retention of Navy physicians in the last decade. The final part of this chapter 
discusses the results of a forecasting model that predict the overall retention rate and the 
retention rate for each specialty. 
B. MULTIVARIATE MODELS’ STRENGTH 
1. Global Null Hypothesis 
The global null hypothesis tests whether at least one explanatory variable in a 
regression model explains the variation in the dependent variable. Here, the dependent 
variable is (STAY). The null hypothesis is that all the coefficients of the explanatory 
variables equal zero, which implies that none of the independent variable have an effect 
on the dependent variable. The alternative hypothesis is that at least one explanatory 
variable explains the variation in the dependent variable and its coefficient does not  
equal zero. 
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In a probit regression model, the Wald statistic (chi-square) can determine the 
explanatory power of the model. Based on its P-value (Pr>chi-sq.) we can reject or accept 
the global null hypothesis. In all of the probit models utilized in this study, we are able to 
reject the null hypothesis and conclude that at least one of the explanatory variables 
explains the variation in the dependent variable (STAY) at a significant level of 0.1 or 
less, except for pathology and neurology, as their models do not yield significant Wald 
statistics due to their limited number of observations. In addition, we are not able to 
construct regression models and conduct statistical analyses for neurological surgeons 
and physical/rehabilitation specialists, since their number of observations are below 30. 
Table 8 represents the values of Wald statistic and its p-value, as well as the maximum 
likelihood ratio for all models used in this study. 
Table 8.   Global Null Hypothesis Test for Probit models. 
Model Likelihood Ratio Chi-Squared DF Pr>Chisq Pseudo R-Squared
Main model –2507.569 631.83 43 0.0000 0.1119
Primary Care Specialties –934.608 238.18 28 0.0000 0.1130
Surgical Specialties –603.148 283.49 31 0.0000 0.1903
Other Specialties –904.889 239.97 32 0.0000 0.1171
Anesthesiology –227.241 29.26 9 0.0006 0.0605
General Surgery –105.135 56.09 9 0.0000 0.2106
Neurological Surgery There are not enough observations to conduct the model 
OB/GYN –186.603 73.35 8 0.0000 0.1643
Ophthalmology –48.107 23.03 8 0.0033 0.1932
Orthopedic Surgery –152.796 50.95 9 0.0000 0.1429
Otolaryngology –51.513 39.36 8 0.0000 0.2764
Urology –53.126 11.48 6 0.0746 0.0975
Occupational Medicine –49.120 17.93 8 0.0218 0.1543
Physical and Rehabilitation There are not enough observations to conduct the model 
Pathology –64.649 11.22 8 0.1897 0.0798
Dermatology –78.579 27.08 9 0.0014 0.1470
Emergency Medicine –232.011 49.14 8 0.0000 0.0958
Family Practice –528.397 110.04 9 0.0000 0.0943
Internal Medicine –160.748 52.97 9 0.0000 0.1415
Neurology –21.358 14.05 9 0.1206 0.2475
Pediatrics –195.172 59.12 10 0.0000 0.1315
Psychiatry –123.255 34.00 9 0.0001 0.1212
Radiology –154.573 51.62 9 0.0000 0.1431
Secondary Model –2517.716 611.54 38 0.0000 0.1083
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2. Pseudo R-Squared 
The traditional R-squared of OLS models ranges between 0 and 1, and measures 
the proportion of the variation in the dependent variable that is explained by the variation 
in the explanatory variables. Because of the nature of the binary dependent variable in 
probit models, R-squared is not applicable. Instead, McFadden’s pseudo R-squared is 
utilized. Pseudo R-squared also ranges between 0 and 1; however, the methodology used 
to calculate it is different than that of the basic R-squared.10 Pseudo R-squared indicates 
whether the model is better explained by including all independent variables or having 
none of them in the model. Table 8 depicts the values of pseudo R-squared of all probit 
models employed in this study. 
C. MAIN MODEL RESULTS 
The results of the main model are presented in Table 9. The probit column shows 
the direction of the effect of the explanatory variables on the overall physicians’ 
retention, while the marginal effect column shows the magnitude of the effect on the 
overall retention probability associated with each explanatory variable and is measured 
for the reference physician. The reference physician is a White, male anesthesiologist 
who accessed the Navy through AFHPSP. He holds the rank of Commander, is 
approximately 39 years old, and has almost 11 years of accumulated military service. He 
faces a pay gap of $98,787.40 and has a 68% probability of staying in the Navy. 
Table 9.   Main Model Results. 
Variables Main Model 
 Probit Marginal Effect 
CivMilGap –0.00466*** –0.00161*** 
(in $1000 increment) (0.000797) (0.000274) 
Female –0.117** –0.0408** 
 (0.0511) (0.0181) 
Male Reference Category 
                                                 
10 Pseudo R-squared = 1- ln Eˆ(model with all regressors
ln Eˆ(model without regressors
, where: ln = natural log; Eˆ=the estimated likelihood. 
OLS R-squared = 1- SSR
TSS
, where: SSR=sum of squared residuals; TSS=total sum of squares for the 
dependent variable. 
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Variables Main Model 
Black –0.601*** –0.227*** 
 (0.0763) (0.0299) 
Asian 0.0994 0.0335 
 (0.103) (0.0337) 
Hispanic 0.0477 0.0163 
 (0.139) (0.0467) 
Other –0.590*** –0.224*** 
 (0.104) (0.0413) 
White Reference Category 
Lt –0.178 –0.0636 
 (0.145) (0.0538) 
Lcdr –0.546*** –0.177*** 
 (0.0805) (0.0242) 
Cpt –0.0680 –0.0238 
 (0.103) (0.0365) 
Cdr Reference Category 
YOS –0.136*** –0.0469*** 
 (0.0229) (0.00791) 
YOS2 0.00207*** 0.000716*** 
 (0.000716) (0.000247) 
Age –0.219*** –0.0756*** 
 (0.0579) (0.0200) 
age2 0.00259*** 0.000894*** 
 (0.000694) (0.000240) 
USUHS 0.142** 0.0478** 
 (0.0649) (0.0211) 
AFHPS_DEF –0.490*** –0.179*** 
 (0.0702) (0.0265) 
FAP –0.480** –0.182** 
 (0.202) (0.0804) 
AFHPSP Reference Category 
InternalMedicine –0.685*** –0.261*** 
 (0.155) (0.0606) 
OccupMedicine –0.221 –0.0801 
 (0.192) (0.0724) 
Pediatrics –0.683*** –0.260*** 
 (0.157) (0.0614) 
FamilyPrac –0.613*** –0.226*** 
 (0.143) (0.0545) 
GenSurg –0.0710 –0.0249 
 (0.125) (0.0447) 
NeuroSurg 0.974*** 0.232*** 
 (0.327) (0.0425) 
OBGYN –0.307** –0.112** 
 (0.124) (0.0475) 
Ophthal –0.0463 –0.0162 
 (0.165) (0.0583) 
 49
Variables Main Model 
OrthoSurg 0.455*** 0.138*** 
 (0.128) (0.0327) 
Otolary 0.0633 0.0215 
 (0.153) (0.0512) 
Urology –0.0680 –0.0239 
 (0.164) (0.0584) 
PhyRehab –0.0969 –0.0343 
 (0.342) (0.124) 
Pathology 0.339** 0.106*** 
 (0.148) (0.0410) 
Dermatology 0.130 0.0435 
 (0.136) (0.0436) 
EmergencyMedicine –0.204* –0.0734 
 (0.121) (0.0450) 
Neurology –0.473** –0.179** 
 (0.228) (0.0907) 
Psychiatry –0.590*** –0.224*** 
 (0.159) (0.0627) 
DiagRadiology 0.455*** 0.138*** 
 (0.128) (0.0328) 
Anesth Reference Category 
fy03 0.163* 0.0544* 
 (0.0901) (0.0289) 
fy04 0.227*** 0.0748*** 
 (0.0860) (0.0268) 
fy05 0.0942 0.0319 
 (0.0864) (0.0286) 
fy06 –0.135 –0.0479 
 (0.0879) (0.0319) 
fy07 0.0191 0.00657 
 (0.0936) (0.0321) 
fy08 –0.243** –0.0880** 
 (0.0969) (0.0366) 
fy09 –0.174* –0.0625* 
 (0.100) (0.0371) 
fy10 –0.253** –0.0920** 
 (0.101) (0.0383) 
fy11 –0.0946 –0.0334 
 (0.107) (0.0387) 
Fy02 Reference Category 
Constant 7.474***  
 (1.144)  
   
Observations 4,478 4,478 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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In the main model, the effect of the civilian-military pay gap on the aggregate 
retention probability is negative and statistically significant at a 0.01 level. A $1,000 
increase in the pay gap above the average reduces the probability to stay by 0.00161  
(i.e., 0.16 percentage point). This is equivalent to a 0.24% reduction in retention rate 
(0.16 percentage point reduction divided by the baseline retention rate of 68%). In other 
words, if the average pay gap (currently at $98,787.4) is reduced to zero, the retention 
rate would increase by 23.5% (98787.40.0000024=0.235). Accordingly, closing the pay 
gap would increase the average retention rate for the sample from 68% to 84%. 
Female physicians have a lower likelihood to stay in the Navy by 0.04 percentage 
point than males. This is found to be statically significant at a level of 0.05. A Black 
physician is less likely to stay in the Navy by 23 percentage points relative to a White 
physician. This result is statistically significant at a 0.01 level. The retention behavior of 
Asian or Hispanic physicians is not statistically different when compared to the retention 
behavior of White physicians. 
Lieutenants are 6.4 percentage points less likely to stay in the Navy than 
Commanders. This result, however, is statistically insignificant. Lieutenant Commanders 
are less likely to stay in the Navy by 17.7 percentage points than Commanders. This is 
statistically significant at a level of 0.01. On the other hand, the retention behavior of 
physicians who hold the rank of Captain is not statistically different than the retention 
behavior of physicians who hold the rank of Commander. 
YOS is found to be statistically significant at a level of 0.01 and negatively affect 
the retention probability. In contrast, YOS2 has a positive effect on the aggregate 
retention behavior. This effect is statistically significant at level of 0.01. These results 
confirm that YOS has a diminishing return on the retention probability, especially in that 
both variables (YOS and YOS2) are jointly significant. To investigate the exact point at 
which the effect of YOS is inverted, the following formula is utilized: β1 ÷ 2(β1) = 0.0469 
÷ 2(0.000716) = 32.8. Accordingly, YOS has a negative, but diminishing, effect on 
retention until 32.8 years of accumulated service, and then the effect becomes positive. 
Age variables (age and age2) are individually and jointly significant at level of 0.01. Age 
affects retention negatively, while age2 has a positive effect on retention. This indicates a 
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diminishing return of age on the retention behavior. To calculate the turning point at 
which age affects retention positively, the following formula is employed: β1 ÷ 2(β1) = 
0.0756 ÷ 2(0.000894) = 42.3 years. Therefore, age affects retention negatively, but at 
decreasing rate up to 42.3 years. Then, the effect of age on retention becomes positive for 
each additional year. 
Physicians assessed through USUHS have a greater probability of staying in the 
Navy by 4.8 percentage points than physicians assessed through AFHPSP. In contrast, 
physicians who joined the Navy through AFHPSP deferred or FAP are less likely to stay 
than AFHPSP physicians by 17.9 and 18.2 percentage points, respectively. Both results 
are statistically significant at a 0.01 level. These findings confirm the expectations that 
USUHS physicians are more likely to be retained, since many of them have prior military 
experience and are initially obligated for a longer time than other physicians. On the 
other hand, AFHPSP-deferred and FAP physicians join the Navy as fully trained 
specialists and have fewer years of obligation than AFHPSP or USUHS physicians. 
Therefore, they have the least military life experience and are more likely  
to leave. 
Specialties’ indicators show that the majority of physicians practicing specialties 
other than anesthesiology are not statistically different than anesthesiologists with respect 
to their retention behavior. Pathologists, radiologists, neurological surgeons, and 
orthopedic surgeons, however, have a higher retention probability than anesthesiologists 
by 10.6, 13.8, 23.2, and 13.8 percentage points, respectively. On the other hand, internal 
medicine specialists, pediatricians, family practitioners, OB/GYN specialists, 
neurologists, and psychiatrists have a retention probability that ranges between 11.2 and 
26.1 percentage points less than that of anesthesiologists. 
D. RESULTS OF THE PRIMARY CARE SPECIALISTS’ MODEL 
This model evaluates the retention behavior of primary care specialists who 
became unobligated from FY2002 through FY2011. The primary care specialists group 
includes family practice specialists, pediatricians, occupational medicine specialists, and 
internal medicine specialists. The results of the primary care specialists’ model is 
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presented in Table 10. The probit column in Table 10 shows the direction and the 
significance of the explanatory variables, while the marginal effect column presents the 
partial effect of each explanatory variable. The partial effect is evaluated for the reference 
physician in the sample. The reference primary care physician is a White, male, family 
practitioner who accessed the Navy through AFHPSP and holds the rank of Commander. 
He has 10.5 years of accumulated service and is 38.7 years old. He faces a pay gap of 
$26,490.80 and has a 68% probability of staying in the service. 
The effect of the civilian-military pay gap has a negative impact on primary care 
specialists’ retention. A $1,000 increase in the pay gap above the average reduces the 
probability of staying by 0.76 percentage point than that of the reference person. 
Commensurately, a $1,000 increase in the pay gap reduces the retention rate of primary 
care physicians by 1.1% (0.76 percentage point reduction divided by the baseline 
retention rate of 68%). This result is significant at a level of 0.01. If the pay gap of 
primary care physicians is reduced to zero, their probability to stay will increased by 
29.7% (26490.8*0.0000112=0.297). Accordingly, closing the pay gap would increase the 
average retention rate for the sample from 68% to 88.2%. 
Compared to the main model, race, gender, and YOS have similar effects when 
restricting the analysis to the primary care group. The effect of age on the retention of 
primary care specialists, however, is found to be statistically insignificant. 
Primary care specialists who hold the rank of Lieutenant Commander or Captain 
are less likely to stay in the Navy than Commanders by 22 and 15 percentage points, 
respectively. Lieutenants, however, are not different than Commanders with regard to 
their retention behavior. 
The difference in accession source has a similar effect on the retention of primary 
care specialists, compared to the findings of the main model, except that the retention 
behavior of physicians who accessed the Navy through FAP and AFHPSP-deferred is no 
different than that of those who join the Corps through the AFHPSP, when restricting the 
analysis to the primary care group. 
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E. RESULTS OF SURGICAL SPECIALTIES’ MODEL 
A separate probit model is constructed to evaluate the retention behavior of the 
surgical specialists group. This group includes general surgery, neurological surgery, 
OB/GYN, ophthalmology, otolaryngology, orthopedic surgery, and urology. The results 
of surgical group model are presented in Table 10. The reference physician for this group 
is a White, male, general surgeon who joined the Navy through the AFHPSP and holds 
the rank of Commander. He has 10.05 years of service and is 38.64 years of age. He faces 
a pay gap of $151,535 and is 68% likely to stay in the Navy. 
The civilian-military pay gap negatively affects the retention behavior of surgical 
specialists. A $1,000 increase in the pay gap above the average reduces the probability to 
stay by 0.14 percentage point less than that of the reference physician. This is equivalent 
to 0.21% reduction in the retention rate of the sample (0.14 percentage point reduction 
divided by the baseline retention rate of 68%). This result is significant at a level of 0.01. 
If the pay gap of surgical specialists is reduced to zero, their probability to stay will 
increase by 31.4% (151535*0.00000207=0.314). Accordingly, if the average retention 
probability for surgeons is 68%, closing the pay gap to zero will increase retention up to 
89.4%. 
Despite that the retention probability of female surgeons is not statistically 
different than that of male surgeons, other demographic and military experience variables 
have a similar effect on the retention behavior when restricting the analysis to the surgical 
specialties’ group compared to the results of the main model. 
F. RESULTS OF OTHER SPECIALTIES’ MODEL 
A separate probit model is created to evaluate the retention behavior of physicians 
with specialties other than primary care and surgery. This group of specialties includes 
anesthesiology, dermatology, emergency medicine, neurology, pathology, physical 
medicine, psychiatry, and radiology. The results of the other specialties group’s model is 
presented in Table 10. The reference physician for this group is a White, male 
anesthesiologist who joined the Navy through the AFHPSP and holds the rank of 
Commander. He has 12 years of service with an age of 40.3 years. The reference 
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physician for this group faces a pay gap of $134,886 and has a retention probability  
of 67%. 
The civilian-military pay gap negatively affects the retention behavior of other 
specialties physicians. A $1,000 increase in the pay gap above the average reduces the 
probability to stay by 0.094 percentage point less than that of the reference person of this 
group. This is equivalent to 0.14% reduction in the retention rate of this group (0.094 
percentage point reduction divided by the baseline retention rate of 67%). This result is 
significant at a level of 0.05. If the average pay gap of the other specialties group is 
reduced to zero, their probability to stay will increase by 18.9% (134886* 
0.00000140=0.189). Accordingly, closing the pay gap to zero will increase retention for 
other specialties’ physicians from 67% to 79.7%. 
Compared to the findings of the main model, demographic variables have a 
similar effect on the retention behavior when restricting the sample to other specialties 
group. Females in this group, however, are not statistically different than males with 
respect to their retention. Likewise, the effect of age on retention is found to be 
statistically insignificant for this group. 
The effect of military experience variables on the retention behavior of other 
specialties physicians is also similar to that of the main model except that the retention 
behavior of specialists who accessed the Navy through the USHUS program in this group 
is not statistically different than of those who joined the Corps through the AFHPSP. 
Table 10.   Primary Care, Surgical Specialties, and Other Specialties Models Results. 
Variables 
Primary Care Model Surgical Specialties Model Other Specialties Model 





CivMilGap –0.0219*** –0.00758*** –0.00438*** –0.00141*** –0.00273** –0.000944**
(in $1000 increment) (0.00342) (0.00118) (0.00159) (0.000510) (0.00112) (0.000386) 
female –0.139* –0.0486* 0.0170 0.00545 –0.148 –0.0523 
 (0.0762) (0.0269) (0.116) (0.0373) (0.0910) (0.0329) 
male Reference Category 
black –0.529*** –0.199*** –0.277* –0.0953* –1.096*** –0.416*** 
 (0.118) (0.0462) (0.145) (0.0526) (0.152) (0.0533) 
asian 0.0271 0.00934 0.0728 0.0229 0.0702 0.0239 
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Variables 
Primary Care Model Surgical Specialties Model Other Specialties Model 





 (0.171) (0.0585) (0.275) (0.0846) (0.150) (0.0501) 
hispanic –0.0143 –0.00496 0.00161 0.000519 0.139 0.0462 
 (0.264) (0.0922) (0.290) (0.0933) (0.208) (0.0665) 
other –0.815*** –0.313*** –0.381** –0.134** –0.558*** –0.212*** 
 (0.178) (0.0683) (0.188) (0.0712) (0.186) (0.0739) 
white Reference Category 
lt –0.337 –0.124 0.171 0.0524 0.104 0.0350 
 (0.233) (0.0893) (0.418) (0.120) (0.292) (0.0958) 
lcdr –0.687*** –0.218*** –0.503*** –0.151*** –0.501*** –0.165*** 
 (0.161) (0.0456) (0.154) (0.0425) (0.124) (0.0386) 
cpt –0.400** –0.148** 0.160 0.0493 –0.0713 –0.0250 
 (0.187) (0.0725) (0.224) (0.0656) (0.160) (0.0568) 
cdr Reference Category 
YOS –0.133*** –0.0461*** –0.225*** –0.0725*** –0.173*** –0.0598*** 
 (0.0361) (0.0125) (0.0497) (0.0158) (0.0351) (0.0121) 
YOS2 0.00169* 0.000584* 0.00391** 0.00126** 0.00388*** 0.00134*** 
 (0.00102) (0.000352) (0.00160) (0.000513) (0.000989) (0.000341) 
age 0.0157 0.00543 –0.421*** –0.136*** –0.0116 –0.00402 
 (0.0126) (0.00436) (0.126) (0.0403) (0.0132) (0.00457) 
age2 Omitted since age and age2
are not jointly significant 
0.00480*** 0.00155*** Omitted since age and age2
are not jointly significant  (0.00149) (0.000476) 
USUHS 0.271** 0.0878** 0.297** 0.0889** 0.0263 0.00906 
 (0.122) (0.0368) (0.133) (0.0367) (0.0977) (0.0335) 
AFHPS_DEF –0.0183 –0.00635 –1.219*** –0.428*** –0.530*** –0.196*** 
 (0.118) (0.0412) (0.178) (0.0608) (0.122) (0.0465) 
FAP –0.299 –0.111 –0.568 –0.208 –0.653* –0.250* 
 (0.372) (0.144) (0.357) (0.141) (0.356) (0.141) 
AFHPSP Reference Category 
InternalMedicine 0.0307 0.0106     
 (0.0957) (0.0328)     
OccupMedicine 0.627*** 0.179***     
 (0.171) (0.0376)     
Pediatrics –0.0675 –0.0236     
 (0.0916) (0.0324)     
FamilyPrac Reference Category     
NeuroSurg   1.134** 0.226***   
   (0.547) (0.0496)   
OBGYN   –0.531*** –0.181***   
   (0.149) (0.0523)   
Ophthal   –0.0802 –0.0264   
   (0.194) (0.0652)   
OrthoSurg   0.476* 0.140**   
   (0.252) (0.0659)   
Otolary   0.0543 0.0172   
   (0.188) (0.0589)   
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Variables 
Primary Care Model Surgical Specialties Model Other Specialties Model 





Urology   –0.0125 –0.00403   
   (0.201) (0.0650)   
GenSurg   Reference Category   
PhyRehab     0.0192 0.00661 
     (0.356) (0.122) 
Pathology     0.449*** 0.137*** 
     (0.154) (0.0402) 
Dermatology     0.140 0.0468 
     (0.139) (0.0448) 
EmergencyMed     –0.0394 –0.0137 
     (0.141) (0.0492) 
Neurology     –0.245 –0.0894 
     (0.246) (0.0936) 
Psychiatry     –0.319 –0.116 
     (0.194) (0.0735) 
DiagRadiology     0.293** 0.0956** 
     (0.143) (0.0436) 
Anesth     Reference Category 
fy03 –0.0747 –0.0262 0.0127 0.00409 0.508*** 0.155*** 
 (0.148) (0.0528) (0.183) (0.0584) (0.159) (0.0412) 
fy04 0.0163 0.00563 0.108 0.0338 0.494*** 0.152*** 
 (0.144) (0.0495) (0.177) (0.0539) (0.145) (0.0383) 
fy05 –0.158 –0.0562 0.0614 0.0195 0.290** 0.0940** 
 (0.143) (0.0522) (0.184) (0.0574) (0.142) (0.0427) 
fy06 –0.359** –0.132** –0.186 –0.0627 0.0611 0.0209 
 (0.143) (0.0548) (0.191) (0.0669) (0.146) (0.0491) 
fy07 –0.188 –0.0677 0.198 0.0603 0.201 0.0664 
 (0.157) (0.0581) (0.206) (0.0587) (0.152) (0.0477) 
fy08 –0.452*** –0.169*** –0.0383 –0.0125 –0.139 –0.0494 
 (0.154) (0.0602) (0.219) (0.0720) (0.161) (0.0590) 
fy09 –0.543*** –0.205*** 0.0182 0.00582 0.0566 0.0193 
 (0.163) (0.0643) (0.213) (0.0678) (0.168) (0.0566) 
fy10 –0.571*** –0.216*** –0.216 –0.0735 –0.0729 –0.0256 
 (0.168) (0.0665) (0.222) (0.0794) (0.166) (0.0591) 
fy11 –0.324* –0.120* –0.182 –0.0614 0.145 0.0483 
 (0.173) (0.0668) (0.245) (0.0868) (0.174) (0.0558) 
Fy02 Reference Category 
Constant 2.495***  12.69***  3.031***  
 (0.478)  (2.540)  (0.535)  
Observations 1,673 1,673 1,183 1,183 1,622 1,622 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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In summary, it appears that the civilian-military pay gap exists and negatively 
affects the retention of unobligated, fully trained Navy physicians. The magnitude of the 
pay gap effect varies across groups of specialties. On the whole, an additional $1,000 in 
the pay gap reduces the retention probability by 0.24%. This effect is mostly driven by 
the retention responsiveness of the primary care specialists for the same amount of pay 
gap increase (1.1%). The other specialties group shows the least responsiveness to the 
pay gap (0.14%) in terms of retention. The effect of the pay gap, however, is measured at 
the average values of the explanatory variables of the sample, which vary from one group 
of specialties to another. The adequate way to measure the propensity of the pay gap 
effect across specialties is by obtaining the retention-pay gap elasticity for each specialty, 
which will be discussed in detail in Section G. 
G. ELASTICITY OF RETENTION 
The aggregate retention elasticity and the elasticity of each specialty group as well 
as the elasticity of 19 individual specialties are presented in Table 11. The elasticity 
represents the percentage change in retention rate for every 1% change in pay gap. To 
calculate the elasticity estimate, the following elasticity formula is employed: 
ε	=	β1 ሺCivMilGapതതതതതതതതതതതതതതൊPሻ, 
where: ε = the elasticity estimate 
β1= the coefficient of (civilian-military pay gap) 
CivMilGapതതതതതതതതതതതതതത = Mean of the civilian-military pay gap 
P = Probability of retention for the sample. 
In order to obtain the elasticity estimates for 19 individual specialties, a separate 
probit model is built for each specialty. The results of the specialties-specific models are 
presented in Appendix A. 
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Table 11.   Elasticity of Retention with Respect to the Pay Gap. 
Specialty Elasticity 
Overall retention –0.24*** 
Primary Care Specialties –0.30*** 
Family Practice –0.37* 
Internal Medicine –0.51** 
Pediatrics –0.19*** 
Occupational Medicine –0.06 
Surgical Specialties –0.31*** 
General Surgery –0.76** 
Neurological Surgery N/A 





Other Specialties –0.19** 
Anesthesiology –0.54** 
Dermatology –0.14 
Emergency Medicine –0.50** 
Neurology 0.75 
Pathology 0.07 
Physical and Rehabilitation N/A 
Psychiatry –0.46*** 
Radiology –0.74*** 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
(N/A) Not Applicable, since there are no enough observations to conduct the analysis. 
  
It appears that Navy’s unobligated specialists are modestly sensitive to the 
civilian-military pay gap. Their overall retention elasticity is (–0.24), which indicates a 
0.24% reduction in the retention probability for each 1% increase in the pay gap or vice 
versa. Accordingly, if the pay gap is reduced by 100%, the total retention probability will 
increase by 24%. If the average retention probability for Navy’s unobligated, fully trained 
physicians is 68%, then by closing the pay gap to zero, the retention probability will 
increase to 84.3%. 
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Surgical specialties group shows the highest retention-pay gap elasticity (–0.314), 
while the other specialties group exhibits the least retention responsiveness to the 
civilian-military pay gap with an elasticity of (–0.19). 
With regard to the individual specialties, OB/GYN specialists are the most 
sensitive to the pay gap with an elasticity of (–1.42), while occupational medicine 
specialists show the least responsiveness to the pay gap with an elasticity of (–0.06). The 
later result, however, is statistically insignificant. 
H. SECONDARY MODEL RESULTS 
One of the secondary questions of this study seeks to understand the effect of the 
protracted GWOT on retention in the Navy’s Medical Corps. For this purpose, a 
secondary probit model is constructed. The variable of interest in this model is 
(post_2004), which is a time dummy variable that has a value of (1) for FYs from 2005 
until 2011 and a value of (0) otherwise. Historically, active duty members showed higher 
rates of retention in the early years that followed the tragedy of 9/11. This increase in 
retention is attributed to an increase in patriotism, which led to a commitment for staying 
on active duty to protect the nation. Chapter II of this study discusses prior studies on the 
effect of OPTEMPO on the retention of medical care givers. The findings of these studies 
confirmed that military medical care professionals showed a higher rate of retention in 
the early stage of the GWOT (Pierre, 2005; Dietrich, 2007). The increased OPTEMPO, 
however, had a negative effect on retention in the Medical Corps, especially after the Iraq 
War (Bristol, 2006). Therefore, we evaluate the effect of the protracted GWOT before 
and after October 1, 2004. This point in time is chosen because, first, it has been three 
years since the war against terror was declared and almost 18 months after the initiation 
of the Iraq War. Second, technically, we are not able to observe the retention behavior of 
Navy Medical Corps personnel before FY2002 due to data limitations. Accordingly, we 
cannot compare retention before and after the event of 9/11. 
The results of the secondary model are presented in Table 12. The post_2004 
variable is found to be statistically significant at a 0.01 level. The prolonged GWOT has a 
negative effect on the overall retention behavior of unobligated, fully trained specialists. 
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The retention probability after FY2004 is 14.1 percentage points less than the retention 
probability during the period from FY2002 through FY2004. 
For more analyses, we investigate whether retention patterns vary systematically 
across specialty groups by the period or not. For this purpose, interactions between 
Post_2004 dummy and surgical specialties’ group dummy (Post_2004_Surgical) and 
between Post_2004 dummy and other specialties’ group dummy (Post_2004_OtherSpc) 
are incorporated in the secondary model. The Post_2004 indicator suggests that for the 
primary care group (the reference specialty group), their retention probability is lower by 
14 percentage points after FY2004 compared to the initial period of the GWOT. The 
positive interaction coefficients between FY2004 and the other specialty groups indicate 
that surgeons and other specialty physicians have a higher probability of staying in the 
Navy relative to the primary care physicians, even though their overall retention 
probability post-FY2004 is still lower than the initial period of the GWOT (e.g.,, for 
surgeons, retention probability post-FY2004 is lower than the pre-FY2004 period by 6.5 
percentage point [–0.141+0.076= –0.065]). The differential time trend in retention 
probability across specialty groups is statistically significant at a level of 0.01. 
Furthermore, an interaction between Post_2004 and female dummy variables is 
also included in the model to observe if the retention behavior of female physicians has 
changed over time as a result of the prolonged GWOT. The results, however, indicate 
that the retention of female physicians after FY2004 is statistically indifferent than their 
retention behavior before FY2004. 
Table 12.   Secondary Model Results. 
Variables Secondary ModelProbit Marginal Effect 
CivMilGap –0.00537*** –0.00186*** 
(in $1000 increment) (0.000810) (0.000279) 
Post_2004 –0.420*** –0.141*** 
 (0.0824) (0.0268) 
Post_2004_Surgical 0.230** 0.0760** 
 (0.115) (0.0359) 
Post_2004_OtherSpc 0.338*** 0.110*** 
 (0.106) (0.0323) 
Post_2004_female 0.127 0.0430 
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Variables Secondary ModelProbit Marginal Effect 
 (0.0982) (0.0323) 
female –0.200** –0.0706** 
 (0.0804) (0.0290) 
male  Reference Category 
black –0.573*** –0.216*** 
 (0.0724) (0.0285) 
asian 0.0917 0.0310 
 (0.102) (0.0337) 
hispanic 0.0610 0.0208 
 (0.138) (0.0463) 
other –0.637*** –0.243*** 
 (0.104) (0.0409) 
white Reference Category 
lt –0.166 –0.0595 
 (0.145) (0.0535) 
lcdr –0.542*** –0.176*** 
 (0.0804) (0.0242) 
cpt –0.0573 –0.0200 
 (0.103) (0.0364) 
cdr Reference Category 
YOS –0.141*** –0.0488*** 
 (0.0229) (0.00791) 
YOS2 0.00220*** 0.000760*** 
 (0.000715) (0.000247) 
age –0.205*** –0.0709*** 
 (0.0578) (0.0200) 
age2 0.00243*** 0.000842*** 
 (0.000692) (0.000239) 
USUHS 0.160** 0.0534** 
 (0.0643) (0.0208) 
AFHPSP_DEF –0.474*** –0.173*** 
 (0.0700) (0.0264) 
FAP –0.561*** –0.214*** 
 (0.201) (0.0800) 
AFHPSP Reference Category 
GenSurg –0.0281 –0.00978 
 (0.148) (0.0519) 
NeuroSurg 1.249*** 0.261*** 
 (0.338) (0.0286) 
OBGYN –0.294** –0.107* 
 (0.144) (0.0552) 
Ophthal 0.00136 0.000471 
 (0.182) (0.0630) 
OrthoSurg 0.590*** 0.171*** 
 (0.147) (0.0337) 
Otolary 0.126 0.0420 
 (0.169) (0.0544) 
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Variables Secondary ModelProbit Marginal Effect 
Urology 0.00977 0.00337 
 (0.177) (0.0611) 
OccupMedicine –0.0828 –0.0292 
 (0.197) (0.0707) 
PhyRehab –0.172 –0.0619 
 (0.338) (0.126) 
Pathology 0.336** 0.105** 
 (0.148) (0.0411) 
Dermatology 0.137 0.0455 
 (0.135) (0.0432) 
EmergencyMedicine –0.241** –0.0871* 
 (0.121) (0.0454) 
FamilyPrac –0.477*** –0.175*** 
 (0.148) (0.0563) 
InternalMedicine –0.561*** –0.212*** 
 (0.160) (0.0631) 
Neurology –0.544** –0.207** 
 (0.228) (0.0907) 
Pediatrics –0.569*** –0.214*** 
 (0.161) (0.0633) 
Psychiatry –0.697*** –0.266*** 
 (0.159) (0.0624) 
DiagRadiology 0.522*** 0.155*** 
 (0.128) (0.0311) 
Anesth Reference Category 
Constant 7.345***  
 (1.143)  
Observations 4,478 4,478 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
I. SENSITIVITY ANALYSES 
Compensations are incorporated in the regression models utilized in this study at 
their medians, rather than their mean, in order to control for the outliner effect. For 
sensitivity analyses, a separate regression model is constructed using the mean of the 
civilian compensations to observe whether the effect of the pay gap on retention differs 
significantly than that of the main model or not. Table 13 presents the results of a 
retention probit model using the civilian compensations’ mean. 
By incorporating the mean of civilian compensations rather than their median, the 
average of the pay deferential is increased from $98,787.4 to $115,522. The effect of the 
civilian-military pay gap on the retention of the average physician increases slightly from 
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(–0.00161) to (–0.00169) for each additional $1,000 increase in the pay gap. This is still 
significant at a 0.01 level. With regard to the impact on the total retention probability, it 
appears that for each $1,000 increase in the pay gap the retention probability reduces by 
0.25% instead of 0.24% in the main model. The statistical significance of other 
explanatory variables has not changed when using the civilian compensations’ mean, 
while the difference between their marginal effects in the main model and the model uses 
the mean of the civilian compensations is found to be practically insignificant. 
Military members have a tax advantage due to the nontaxable nature of their BAH 
and BAS. The analyses conducted in this study, however, do not take these tax 
advantages into account when calculating the military pays for two reasons: first, civilian 
compensations are measured before taxes. Second, military tax advantages are considered 
to be benefits, rather than pay. Accordingly, it is more appropriate to not include the tax 
advantages in the military pay calculations. Nevertheless, a supplementary probit model 
is constructed using military pays that include BAH and BAS tax advantages in order to 
observe if the pay gap’s effect on retention differs than that of the main model.11 Table 
13 shows the results of the retention model that incorporates military pay with tax 
advantages. The average civilian-military pay gap is reduced from $98,787.4 to 
$93,666.2 by including the tax advantages. The results in Table 13 indicate that the effect 
of the civilian-military pay gap on retention is exactly the same whether we include the 
tax advantages in the military pay or not. Similarly, with regard to the effect of other 
explanatory variables, they are practically indifferent than their results in the main model, 
while maintaining the same levels of statistical significance. 
Table 13.   Results of Sensitivity Analysis Models. 
Variables 
Retention Model with Civilian 
Compensations’ Mean Retention Model with Tax Advantages
Probit Marginal Effect Probit Marginal Effect 
CivMilGap –0.00489*** –0.00169*** –0.00466*** –0.00161*** 
(in $1000 increment) (0.000746) (0.000256) (0.000797) (0.000274) 
female –0.117** –0.0410** –0.117** –0.0408** 
                                                 
11 According to Bureau of Labor Statistics, the average American tax rate is 25%. Therefore, this rate 
is implemented in our analysis for physicians with dependents, filing jointly. 
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Variables 
Retention Model with Civilian 
Compensations’ Mean Retention Model with Tax Advantages
Probit Marginal Effect Probit Marginal Effect 
 (0.0512) (0.0181) (0.0511) (0.0181) 
male Reference Category 
black –0.598*** –0.226*** –0.601*** –0.227*** 
 (0.0763) (0.0300) (0.0763) (0.0299) 
asian 0.100 0.0337 0.0994 0.0335 
 (0.103) (0.0336) (0.103) (0.0337) 
hispanic 0.0400 0.0137 0.0477 0.0163 
 (0.139) (0.0469) (0.139) (0.0467) 
other –0.594*** –0.226*** –0.590*** –0.224*** 
 (0.104) (0.0413) (0.104) (0.0413) 
white Reference Category 
lt –0.179 –0.0640 –0.174 –0.0622 
 (0.145) (0.0538) (0.145) (0.0538) 
lcdr –0.546*** –0.177*** –0.544*** –0.176*** 
 (0.0805) (0.0241) (0.0805) (0.0242) 
cpt –0.0730 –0.0256 –0.0682 –0.0239 
 (0.103) (0.0364) (0.103) (0.0365) 
cdr Reference Category 
YOS –0.129*** –0.0445*** –0.136*** –0.0469*** 
 (0.0230) (0.00792) (0.0229) (0.00791) 
YOS2 0.00190*** 0.000655*** 0.00207*** 0.000716*** 
 (0.000717) (0.000247) (0.000716) (0.000247) 
age –0.213*** –0.0734*** –0.219*** –0.0756*** 
 (0.0580) (0.0200) (0.0579) (0.0200) 
age2 0.00252*** 0.000870*** 0.00259*** 0.000894*** 
 (0.000695) (0.000239) (0.000694) (0.000240) 
USUHS 0.151** 0.0505** 0.142** 0.0478** 
 (0.0650) (0.0210) (0.0649) (0.0211) 
AFHPSP_DEF –0.460*** –0.167*** –0.490*** –0.179*** 
 (0.0709) (0.0267) (0.0702) (0.0265) 
FAP –0.450** –0.169** –0.480** –0.182** 
 (0.202) (0.0801) (0.202) (0.0804) 
AFHPSP Reference Category 
GenSurg –0.0320 –0.0111 –0.0711 –0.0250 
 (0.122) (0.0429) (0.125) (0.0447) 
NeuroSurg 1.269*** 0.262*** 0.974*** 0.232*** 
 (0.343) (0.0278) (0.327) (0.0425) 
OBGYN –0.260** –0.0943** –0.307** –0.112** 
 (0.117) (0.0443) (0.124) (0.0475) 
Ophthal 0.0602 0.0204 –0.0463 –0.0162 
 (0.163) (0.0544) (0.165) (0.0583) 
OrthoSurg 0.666*** 0.187*** 0.455*** 0.138*** 
 (0.143) (0.0301) (0.128) (0.0327) 
Otolary 0.226 0.0731 0.0633 0.0215 
 (0.153) (0.0459) (0.153) (0.0512) 
Urology 0.0367 0.0125 –0.0680 –0.0239 
 (0.164) (0.0555) (0.164) (0.0584) 
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Variables 
Retention Model with Civilian 
Compensations’ Mean Retention Model with Tax Advantages
Probit Marginal Effect Probit Marginal Effect 
OccupMedicine –0.236 –0.0859 –0.221 –0.0801 
 (0.186) (0.0707) (0.192) (0.0724) 
PhyRehab 0.0612 0.0207 –0.0969 –0.0343 
 (0.337) (0.112) (0.342) (0.124) 
Pathology 0.502*** 0.148*** 0.339** 0.106*** 
 (0.148) (0.0353) (0.148) (0.0410) 
Dermatology 0.343** 0.107*** 0.130 0.0435 
 (0.141) (0.0388) (0.136) (0.0436) 
EmergencyMedicine –0.212* –0.0762* –0.204* –0.0735 
 (0.117) (0.0437) (0.121) (0.0450) 
FamilyPrac –0.630*** –0.233*** –0.613*** –0.226*** 
 (0.135) (0.0515) (0.143) (0.0545) 
InternalMedicine –0.702*** –0.267*** –0.685*** –0.261*** 
 (0.148) (0.0581) (0.155) (0.0606) 
Neurology –0.404* –0.151* –0.473** –0.179** 
 (0.222) (0.0876) (0.228) (0.0907) 
Pediatrics –0.694*** –0.263*** –0.684*** –0.260*** 
 (0.149) (0.0583) (0.157) (0.0614) 
Psychiatry –0.607*** –0.231*** –0.590*** –0.224*** 
 (0.153) (0.0603) (0.159) (0.0627) 
DiagRadiology 0.519*** 0.154*** 0.455*** 0.138*** 
 (0.130) (0.0314) (0.128) (0.0328) 
Anesth Reference Category 
fy03 0.149* 0.0496* 0.163* 0.0545* 
 (0.0902) (0.0291) (0.0901) (0.0289) 
fy04 0.229*** 0.0751*** 0.226*** 0.0744*** 
 (0.0861) (0.0267) (0.0860) (0.0268) 
fy05 0.0719 0.0244 0.0919 0.0311 
 (0.0855) (0.0286) (0.0863) (0.0286) 
fy06 –0.140 –0.0496 –0.138 –0.0491 
 (0.0872) (0.0317) (0.0878) (0.0319) 
fy07 0.0112 0.00385 0.0150 0.00518 
 (0.0922) (0.0317) (0.0934) (0.0320) 
fy08 –0.255*** –0.0926** –0.248** –0.0900** 
 (0.0956) (0.0361) (0.0967) (0.0365) 
fy09 –0.172* –0.0617* –0.182* –0.0653* 
 (0.0996) (0.0368) (0.0998) (0.0370) 
fy10 –0.249** –0.0901** –0.261*** –0.0951** 
 (0.100) (0.0380) (0.101) (0.0382) 
fy11 –0.0756 –0.0265 –0.103 –0.0365 
 (0.107) (0.0382) (0.107) (0.0386) 
fy02 Reference Category 
Constant 7.360***  7.451***  
 (1.147)  (1.145)  
Observations 4,478 4,478 4,478 4,478 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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J. PROJECTION MODELS RESULTS 
Based on the BUMED dataset, there are only 10 records of yearly retention rates 
(FY2002 through FY2011). With such limited availability of historical data and due to 
the nature of the time-series smoothing models, the analysis is conducted to extrapolate 
the expected retention rates for one additional year—to predict the retention rates for 
FY2012. Four time-series smoothing models are implemented: the mean forecasting 
model, the three periods moving average forecasting model, the four periods moving 
average forecasting model, and the exponential smoothing forecasting model. These 
models are utilized to project the aggregate retention rates, as well as the retention rates 
for each specialty and specialty group specified in this study. The results of the four 
models are presented in Appendix B. 
1. The Overall Accuracy of the Forecasting Models 
The accuracy of a forecasting model used in this study is measured based on the 
forecasting error, which is the deviation between the actual retention rates and the 
forecasted retention rates. The most common measures of the forecasting error are: 
Mean Absolut Deviation (MAD), Mean Squared Error (MSE), and Mean Absolute 
Percent Error (MAPE). MAD is the average of the absolute errors between the actual 





where: 	At = Actual value for period t 
Ft = Forecasted value for period t 
T = The total number of time periods. 
MSE is the average of the squared errors between the actual values and the 







MAPE is the average of the absolute errors between the actual value and the 








In this study, the goodness of a forecasting model is evaluated based on MAPE, 
when possible. The reason is that MAPE accounts for the magnitude of values being 
forecasted, while MAD and MSE are inflated if the values being forecasted are  
very large. 
Table 14 presents the actual and the forecasted retention rates from FY2002 
through FY2011, as well as the projected retention rates for FY2012. This is evaluated 
for the aggregate pool of fully trained, unobligated physicians and for the physicians of 
each specialty group and each individual specialty. Table 14 indicates which forecasting 
model is utilized, based on its MAPE, whenever it is applicable. 
Table 14.   Projection Models Results. 
Fiscal Years 
Specialty 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Overall 
retention 
Actual Rates 0.74 0.73 0.79 0.73 0.62 0.65 0.55 0.60 0.53 0.58   
Predicted Rates (1)       0.75 0.75 0.71 0.67 0.61 0.60 0.56 0.57
Primary Care 
Specialties 
Actual Rates 0.78 0.72 0.78 0.72 0.64 0.62 0.55 0.55 0.56 0.61   
Predicted Rates (1)       0.76 0.74 0.71 0.66 0.60 0.58 0.55 0.57
Family Practice Actual Rates 0.79 0.74 0.79 0.68 0.60 0.63 0.54 0.59 0.50 0.64   Predicted Rates (1)       0.78 0.74 0.69 0.64 0.59 0.59 0.54 0.58
Internal 
Medicine 
Actual Rates 0.79 0.57 0.81 0.82 0.69 0.54 0.60 0.50 0.61 0.53   
Predicted Rates (1)       0.72 0.73 0.77 0.68 0.61 0.55 0.57 0.55
Pediatrics Actual Rates 0.71 0.77 0.76 0.76 0.70 0.68 0.55 0.46 0.67 0.63   Predicted Rates (3) 0.71 0.71 0.73 0.74 0.75 0.73 0.72 0.67 0.61 0.62 0.62
Occupational 
Medicine 
Actual Rates 1.00 0.69 0.67 0.89 0.64 0.58 0.55 0.75 0.57 0.60   
Predicted Rates (1)       0.79 0.75 0.73 0.71 0.59 0.63 0.62 0.64
Surgical 
Specialties 
Actual Rates 0.75 0.73 0.79 0.74 0.57 0.69 0.57 0.63 0.49 0.48   
Predicted Rates (3) 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.76 0.75 0.70 0.69 0.66 0.65 0.60 0.57
General 
Surgery 
Actual Rates 0.88 0.79 0.88 0.68 0.54 0.67 0.60 0.76 0.41 0.54   
Predicted Rates (3) 0.88 0.88 0.86 0.86 0.81 0.73 0.71 0.68 0.70 0.62 0.59
Neurological 
Surgery 
Actual Rates 0.67 0.80 0.50 0.00 1.00 0.50 0.67 0.00 1.00 0.50   
Predicted Rates (2) *         0.49 0.58 0.50 0.54 0.54 0.54 0.54
Orthopedic 
Surgery 
Actual Rates 0.81 0.67 0.82 0.59 0.67 0.68 0.46 0.47 0.64 0.46   
Predicted Rates (1)       0.77 0.69 0.69 0.64 0.60 0.54 0.52 0.52
OB/GYN Actual Rates 0.61 0.55 0.73 0.88 0.57 0.70 0.67 0.71 0.52 0.63   Predicted Rates (2)         0.69 0.68 0.72 0.70 0.66 0.65 0.63
Ophthalmology Actual Rates 0.75 0.85 0.92 0.70 0.45 0.67 0.71 0.71 0.50 0.00   Predicted Rates (3) * 0.75 0.75 0.78 0.82 0.79 0.69 0.68 0.69 0.70 0.64 0.45
Otolaryngology Actual Rates 0.85 0.85 0.83 0.86 0.78 0.60 0.29 0.67 0.50 0.14   Predicted Rates (3) 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.83 0.76 0.62 0.63 0.59 0.46
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Fiscal Years 
Specialty 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Urology Actual Rates 0.69 0.94 0.65 0.71 0.20 1.00 0.83 0.50 0.17 0.67   Predicted Rates (4) 0.69 0.69 0.77 0.73 0.73 0.57 0.70 0.74 0.67 0.52 0.56
Other 
Specialties  
Actual Rates 0.69 0.73 0.80 0.73 0.63 0.66 0.53 0.62 0.54 0.60   
Predicted Rates (3) 0.69 0.69 0.70 0.73 0.73 0.70 0.69 0.64 0.64 0.61 0.61
Anesthesiology Actual Rates 0.51 0.68 0.82 0.67 0.67 0.63 0.54 0.62 0.55 0.58   Predicted Rates (1)       0.67 0.72 0.72 0.65 0.61 0.59 0.57 0.58
Dermatology  Actual Rates 0.70 0.68 0.94 0.78 0.47 0.71 0.50 0.56 0.43 0.88   Predicted Rates (3) 0.70 0.70 0.69 0.77 0.77 0.68 0.69 0.63 0.61 0.55 0.65
Emergency 
Medicine 
Actual Rates 0.87 0.77 0.76 0.70 0.66 0.59 0.56 0.64 0.60 0.64   
Predicted Rates(1)       0.80 0.74 0.71 0.65 0.60 0.59 0.60 0.63
Neurology Actual Rates 0.71 0.20 1.00 0.83 0.50 1.00 0.33 0.50 0.75 0.50   Predicted Rates (1)       0.64 0.68 0.78 0.78 0.61 0.61 0.53 0.58
Pathology  Actual Rates 0.76 0.64 0.72 0.67 0.63 0.89 0.70 0.89 0.44 1.00   Predicted Rates (4)   0.76 0.70 0.71 0.70 0.68 0.72 0.72 0.74 0.70 0.73
Physical and 
Rehabilitation 
Actual Rates Not enough observations to conduct the analysis Predicted Rates 
Psychiatry Actual Rates 0.50 0.89 0.64 0.78 0.69 0.43 0.83 0.55 0.53 0.56   Predicted Rates (1)       0.68 0.77 0.71 0.63 0.65 0.60 0.64 0.54
Radiology Actual Rates 0.63 0.76 0.89 0.78 0.62 0.87 0.26 0.62 0.53 0.36   Predicted Rates (3) 0.63 0.63 0.67 0.73 0.75 0.71 0.76 0.61 0.61 0.59 0.52
(1) Three periods Moving Average Forecasting 
(2) Four periods Moving Average Forecasting 
(3) Exponential Smoothing Forecasting 
(4) Mean Forecasting 
(*) MSE used instead of MAPE since one or more actual observations equals zero. 
 
Figure 3 illustrates the actual retention rates for the aggregate pool of fully 
trained, unobligated Navy physicians from FY2002 through FY2011 as well as the 
predicated retention rates from FY2002 through FY2012 using the three periods moving 
average forecasting model. Figure 3 also displays the upper and lower bounds of a 90% 
Confidence Interval (CI) for FY2012 prediction.  
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Figure 3.  Actual Retention Rates vs. Predicted Retention Rates 
According to the projection models, the aggregate retention probability for 
FY2012 is expected to be 57%, which is one percentage point lower than the actual 
retention rate of FY2011 (58%) with a 90% upper CI of (66% ) and a lower CI of ( 48%). 
The expected reduction in the overall retention probability is driven by a forecasted 
reduced of four percentage points in the retention rate of primary care specialists in 
FY2012. 
On the other hand, the surgical specialties group is expected to demonstrate an 
increase in the retention rate by 9 percentage points in FY2012 compared to that of 
FY2011. Similarly, the other specialties group retention rate in FY2012 is expected to be 
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. CONCLUSIONS 
This study examines the effect that the civilian-military pay gap has on the 
retention of Navy doctors across 19 specialties for the years between FY2002 and 
FY2011. The probit results suggest that the civilian-military pay gap does, in fact, affect 
the retention of unobligated Navy medical specialists. As the civilian-military pay gap 
increases, it becomes more difficult to retain doctors in the Navy when their skills are 
easily transferable into the civilian sector. Retaining unobligated Navy medical 
specialists is an important planning and business process, and is critical to the Navy in 
maintaining the desired manning of skilled and experienced medical personnel. Having 
accurate plans and policies will help BUMED to better assess its manning projections 
among the various Medical Corps specialties, and it will also assist in setting adequate 
special and incentive pay rates to maintain its manning requirements. 
In general, our study finds that, on average, there is a pay gap of $98,787 between 
a civilian and a military provider, and 67% of Navy physicians stay beyond their initial 
obligation. When examining individual subspecialties in the Medical Corps, we find that 
OB/GYN has the highest sensitivity to the pay gap with an elasticity of (–1.42), while 
pediatrics specialists display the least responsiveness to the pay gap with an elasticity of 
(–0.19). Furthermore, the analysis suggests that a person’s ethnicity has a large impact on 
that person’s propensity to stay in the Navy. For example, Blacks have a 23-percentage 
point higher probability of leaving the Navy compared to their White counterparts. 
However, over 75% of our study’s sample was considered White; therefore, a small 
change among the Blacks participants had a greater impact on our results, due to sample 
size. Finally, we found that the providers who used the USUHS accession source had a 
higher probability of staying in the Navy relative to providers who used the other 
accession sources offered by the Navy. 
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As a robustness check, we include the tax benefits that military personnel receive 
to determine if the main results change.12 The results are not sensitive to changes in the 
civilian-military pay gap that result from tax benefits and find that the effect of the 
civilian-military pay gap on retention was extremely close. 
In addition to examining how the civilian-military pay gap affects retention, we 
also examine the effect that the protracted GWOT had on the probability of staying in the 
Medical Corps. Our study finds that the protracted GWOT had a negative effect on the 
overall retention behavior of unobligated, fully trained specialists. Compared to the start 
of the GWOT (FY2002 to FY2004), our results suggest that the prolonged GWOT period 
of FY2005 to FY2011 increased the average probability that a medical specialist would 
leave the Navy by 14.1 percentage points, with the largest impact felt among the primary 
care physicians. We further find that while the Navy overall had a higher retention rate 
compared to 2008 before the recession, the Medical Corps has not been as fortunate in 
retaining its personnel. 
While we recognize that financial compensation is not the only factor considered 
when providers decide to stay or leave the Navy, we believe that the civilian-military pay 
gap is a key determinant. Other variables that affect providers’ decisions are military 
lifestyle, military benefits, and OPTEMPO. Unfortunately, one limitation of our study is 
that we did not have access to these variables: however, it captures a major key aspect 
that predicts retention behavior and provides evidence that the civilian-military pay gap 
does affect retention. The Navy will have to reconsider its current financial compensation 
program and weigh the costs and benefits, if they want to increase the retention rate of 
these professionals. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
As the civilian-military pay gap increases, it becomes more difficult to retain 
doctors in the Navy when their skills are easily transferable into the civilian sector. As a 
result, the Navy will potentially always have issues retaining its medical providers. The 
inherent nature of the military pay structure means that providers will not get 
                                                 
12 The pay gap was reduced from $98,787 to $93,666 when the tax benefit was included in our model. 
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compensated as well as their counterparts in the civilian sector. However, in order to 
maintain or increase its retention rate of medical providers, we recommend that the Navy 
consider the following: 
 Continue to strengthen its current accession sources for becoming a 
medical officer in the U.S. Navy, especially the USUHS program. In 
particular, we recommend that the USUHS program increase its annual 
quota limits. According to our findings, USUHS students have a 22.7% 
and 23% higher probability of staying in the Navy, relative to the 
AFHPSP and FAP, respectively. Therefore, the Navy should increase or 
shift its funding in support of the USUHS program. 
 Increase the MSP amount and offer the MSP earlier, rather than waiting 
until the providers come to their initial decision to stay in or leave the 
Navy. In our study, we find that LCDRs have a 17.7% greater chance of 
attrition than CDRs, who have been in the Navy longer. Therefore, offer 
the MSP earlier to the LTs and LCDRs before the provider’s initial 
obligation of service is over. Also, increase the MSP amount given to 
these officers. With a $10,000 annual increase in the primary care 
category, the Navy could potentially increase retention by 11%. The 
increase in the MSP amount could be used to target these junior Medical 
Corps officers and reduce the civilian-military pay gap, which would, in 
turn, increase the probability that they would stay in the Navy. 
 Increase MSP to the primary care and surgical specialty category relative 
to the other specialty group. This will have a larger impact on retention, 
respectively, than in the other specialty category because the average 
civilian-military pay gap in the other specialties category is $134,886, 
compared to the pay gap for a primary care specialist, which is only 
$26,490. With current DoD budget issues, the Navy will be financially 
unable to reduce the pay gap in the other specialties category. For 
example, if the Navy reduced the other specialties civilian-military pay 
gap to zero, it will increase the provider retention rate from 67% to 79.7%, 
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a difference of only 12.7%; whereas, if the Navy used the money saved 
from to retaining other specialties in primary care service, the Navy would 
get a better return on its investment. Therefore, the Navy should increase 
residency personnel quotas and increase their obligations of service when 
they finish their residency. With the additional money saved, the Navy 
could pay for the referrals of patients who need these specific services 
and/or use the savings to offset the increase in TRICARE premium. 
Furthermore, the Navy could staff the Military Treatment Facilities 
(MTFs) with senior civilian providers and with junior providers who have 
just graduated from school. 
These recommendations many not solve the retention problems in the Medical 
Corps; however, these proposals provide some alternatives that the Navy could 
implement to reduce the civilian-military pay gap. 
C. FURTHER RESEARCH 
Previous findings show that basic pay, job security, retirement pay, job 
enjoyment, and family medical care were the top five factors that encouraged individuals 
to stay in the military. On the other hand, basic pay, amount of personal and family time, 
quality of leadership, job enjoyment, and deployment were the top five factors for leaving 
the military (Weiss et al., 2003). In our study, we only looked at how the civilian-military 
pay gap has affected retention of doctors in the Medical Corps. One limitation of our 
study is that we did not have access to data on marital status, dependents, degree of 
patriotism, number of deployments, amount of personal and family time, etc. Future 
research should use these variables in the analysis. However, we do discuss how basic 
demographics, such as gender and race, affect retention rates. Additional research should 
further inspect why the Blacks population had a higher propensity for attrition, and why 
there has not been a significant increase in the number of female medical providers in the 
last 10 years. 
This study looked at the tax advantage that the Navy providers received and tested 
how that would affect retention; however, we did not include the huge benefit for medical 
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providers in the Navy, which is that Navy providers do not have to carry malpractice 
insurance. Depending on the specialty of these providers, this can have an immense 
impact on the civilian-military pay gap. We recommend that in the future, researchers 
replicate our initial study and factor in the effect of malpractice insurance on the  
civilian-military pay gap, which would give a more realistic picture of the civilian-
military pay differential. 
Finally, we recommend that future research involve a cost-benefit analysis (CBA) 
regarding our recommendations. The research could focus on the cost of implementing 
our recommendations and, if these recommendations are implemented, how much money 
it could save/cost the Navy. Furthermore, researchers should examine how the quality of 








APPENDIX A. INCENTIVE SPECIAL PAY (ISP) AND MULTIYEAR SPECIAL PAY (MSP) TABLE 
 
Source:  Historical Data received from Director, Navy Medical Special Pays Program Chief, Bureau of Medicine and Surgery (M13) 
 
Specialty: ISP ISP w/MSP ISP ISP w/MSP ISP ISP w/MSP ISP ISP w/MSP ISP ISP w/MSP ISP ISP w/MSP ISP ISP w/MSP ISP ISP w/MSP ISP ISP w/MSP ISP ISP w/MSP
 Aerospace Med $12,000 $8,000 $13,000 $12,000 $12,000 $12,000 $12,000 $12,000 $13,000 $13,000 $13,000 $13,000 $13,000 $13,000 $20,000 $20,000 $20,000 $20,000 $20,000 $20,000
Anesthesiology $36,000 $12,000 $36,000 $12,000 $36,000 $36,000 $36,000 $36,000 $36,000 $42,000 $36,000 $42,000 $36,000 $50,000 $36,000 $50,000 $36,000 $50,000 $36,000 $50,000
Cardiology-Adult $36,000 $12,000 $36,000 $12,000 $36,000 $36,000 $36,000 $36,000 $36,000 $41,000 $36,000 $41,000 $36,000 $41,000 $36,000 $41,000 $36,000 $41,000 $36,000 $41,000
Dermatology $18,000 $8,000 $18,000 $12,000 $18,000 $18,000 $18,000 $18,000 $18,000 $18,000 $18,000 $18,000 $18,000 $18,000 $20,000 $20,000 $20,000 $20,000 $20,000 $20,000
Emergency Medicine $26,000 $8,000 $26,000 $12,000 $26,000 $26,000 $26,000 $26,000 $26,000 $26,000 $26,000 $26,000 $26,000 $26,000 $26,000 $30,000 $26,000 $30,000 $26,000 $30,000
Family Practice $13,000 $12,000 $13,000 $12,000 $13,000 $13,000 $13,000 $13,000 $13,000 $13,000 $13,000 $13,000 $13,000 $13,000 $20,000 $20,000 $20,000 $20,000 $20,000 $20,000
Gastroenterology $23,000 $8,000 $26,000 $12,000 $26,000 $23,000 $26,000 $23,000 $26,000 $29,000 $26,000 $29,000 $26,000 $29,000 $26,000 $29,000 $26,000 $29,000 $26,000 $29,000
General Surgery $29,000 $12,000 $29,000 $12,000 $29,000 $29,000 $29,000 $29,000 $29,000 $34,000 $29,000 $34,000 $29,000 $34,000 $29,000 $50,000 $29,000 $50,000 $29,000 $50,000
Internal Medicine $14,000 $8,000 $14,000 $12,000 $14,000 $14,000 $14,000 $14,000 $14,000 $14,000 $14,000 $14,000 $14,000 $14,000 $20,000 $20,000 $20,000 $20,000 $20,000 $20,000
Neurology $14,000 $8,000 $14,000 $12,000 $14,000 $14,000 $14,000 $14,000 $14,000 $14,000 $14,000 $14,000 $14,000 $14,000 $20,000 $20,000 $20,000 $20,000 $20,000 $20,000
Neurosurgery $36,000 $12,000 $36,000 $12,000 $36,000 $36,000 $36,000 $36,000 $36,000 $41,000 $36,000 $50,000 $36,000 $50,000 $36,000 $60,000 $36,000 $60,000 $36,000 $60,000
OB/GYN $31,000 $8,000 $31,000 $12,000 $31,000 $31,000 $31,000 $31,000 $31,000 $31,000 $31,000 $31,000 $31,000 $31,000 $31,000 $31,000 $31,000 $31,000 $31,000 $31,000
Ophthalmology $28,000 $8,000 $28,000 $12,000 $28,000 $28,000 $28,000 $28,000 $28,000 $28,000 $28,000 $28,000 $28,000 $28,000 $28,000 $30,000 $28,000 $30,000 $28,000 $30,000
Orthopedics $36,000 $12,000 $36,000 $12,000 $36,000 $36,000 $36,000 $36,000 $36,000 $41,000 $36,000 $41,000 $36,000 $41,000 $36,000 $50,000 $36,000 $50,000 $36,000 $50,000
Otolaryngology $30,000 $8,000 $30,000 $12,000 $30,000 $30,000 $30,000 $30,000 $30,000 $33,000 $30,000 $33,000 $30,000 $33,000 $30,000 $35,000 $30,000 $35,000 $30,000 $35,000
Pathology $16,000 $8,000 $16,000 $12,000 $16,000 $16,000 $16,000 $16,000 $16,000 $19,000 $16,000 $19,000 $16,000 $19,000 $20,000 $20,000 $20,000 $20,000 $20,000 $20,000
Pediatrics $12,000 $8,000 $12,000 $12,000 $12,000 $12,000 $12,000 $12,000 $12,000 $12,000 $12,000 $12,000 $13,000 $13,000 $20,000 $20,000 $20,000 $20,000 $20,000 $20,000
Phys Med $12,000 $8,000 $13,000 $12,000 $12,000 $12,000 $12,000 $12,000 $13,000 $13,000 $13,000 $13,000 $13,000 $13,000 $20,000 $20,000 $20,000 $20,000 $20,000 $20,000
Prev/Occ Med $12,000 $8,000 $13,000 $12,000 $12,000 $12,000 $12,000 $12,000 $13,000 $13,000 $13,000 $13,000 $13,000 $13,000 $20,000 $20,000 $20,000 $20,000 $20,000 $20,000
Psychiatry $15,000 $12,000 $15,000 $12,000 $15,000 $15,000 $15,000 $15,000 $15,000 $15,000 $15,000 $15,000 $15,000 $15,000 $20,000 $20,000 $20,000 $20,000 $20,000 $20,000
Pulmonary/ Critical Care $23,000 $8,000 $23,000 $12,000 $23,000 $23,000 $23,000 $23,000 $23,000 $26,000 $23,000 $26,000 $23,000 $26,000 $23,000 $26,000 $23,000 $26,000 $23,000 $26,000
Radiology $36,000 $12,000 $36,000 $12,000 $36,000 $36,000 $36,000 $36,000 $36,000 $42,000 $36,000 $42,000 $36,000 $42,000 $36,000 $42,000 $36,000 $42,000 $36,000 $42,000
Urology $28,000 $8,000 $28,000 $12,000 $28,000 $28,000 $28,000 $28,000 $28,000 $28,000 $28,000 $28,000 $28,000 $28,000 $28,000 $28,000 $28,000 $28,000 $28,000 $28,000
FY11FY02 FY03 FY04 FYO5 FY06 FY08 FY09 FY10FY07
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APPENDIX B. SPECIALTIES-SPECIFIC MODELS 
Variables 
Anesthesiology General Surgery OB/GYN 





CivMilGap –0.00530** –0.00198** –0.0147** –0.00423** –0.0318*** –0.0110*** 
 (0.00245) (0.000912) (0.00676) (0.00184) (0.00524) (0.00175) 
female –0.0575 –0.0216 –0.0280 –0.00810 0.138 0.0482 
 (0.210) (0.0796) (0.276) (0.0805) (0.160) (0.0566) 
male Reference Category 
minority –0.524*** –0.202*** –0.586** –0.191** 0.0908 0.0311 
 (0.171) (0.0663) (0.255) (0.0898) (0.175) (0.0593) 
white Reference Category 
lt_lcdr –0.736** –0.244*** –0.269 –0.0724 –0.610 –0.176* 
 (0.306) (0.0866) (0.327) (0.0820) (0.396) (0.0906) 
cdr_cpt Reference Category 
YOS –0.112** –0.0418** –0.0269 –0.00773 –0.0173 –0.00600 
 (0.0559) (0.0208) (0.0389) (0.0111) (0.0297) (0.0103) 
YOS2 0.00150 0.000559 Omitted since YOS & YOS2are not jointly significant  (0.00201) (0.000751) 
age 0.00416 0.00155 –0.530** –0.152*** –0.0169 –0.00585 
 (0.0228) (0.00852) (0.214) (0.0582) (0.0263) (0.00910) 
age2 Omitted since age & age2are 
not jointly significant 
0.00528** 0.00152** Omitted since age & age2are 
not jointly significant  (0.00242) (0.000663) 
None_AFHPSP –0.0429 –0.0160 –0.287 –0.0806 0.150 0.0514 
 (0.160) (0.0598) (0.293) (0.0792) (0.199) (0.0671) 
AFHPSP Reference Category 
Post_2004 0.00557 0.00208 –0.301 –0.0838 0.432** 0.152** 
 (0.191) (0.0714) (0.284) (0.0766) (0.182) (0.0643) 
Prior_2004 Reference Category 
Constant 2.790***  15.99***  4.155***  
 (0.923)  (4.808)  (1.037)  
Observations 368 368 219 219 349 349 
Standard errors in parentheses 




Opthalmology Orthopedic Surgery Otolaryngology 





CivMilGap –0.00746 –0.00243 –0.00533** –0.00184** –0.0180*** –0.00516*** 
 (0.00673) (0.00214) (0.00235) (0.000804) (0.00535) (0.00148) 
female 0.270 0.0850 –0.262 –0.0955 –0.483 –0.159 
 (0.361) (0.109) (0.432) (0.165) (0.563) (0.205) 
male Reference Category 
minority –0.932 –0.347 –0.437** –0.158** –0.618 –0.202 
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Variables 
Opthalmology Orthopedic Surgery Otolaryngology 





 (0.599) (0.228) (0.208) (0.0777) (0.396) (0.140) 
white Reference Category 
lt_lcdr –0.815 –0.262 –0.508* –0.159** –0.371 –0.107 
 (0.698) (0.215) (0.279) (0.0776) (0.523) (0.151) 
cdr_cpt Reference Category 
YOS –0.0889 –0.0290 –0.0559 –0.0193 –0.00302 –0.000866 
 (0.0870) (0.0283) (0.0362) (0.0124) (0.0614) (0.0176) 
YOS2 Omitted since YOS & YOS2are not jointly significant  
age –0.0320 –0.0104 –0.469** –0.162** –0.106* –0.0304* 
 (0.0683) (0.0223) (0.211) (0.0717) (0.0607) (0.0173) 
age2 Omitted since age & 
age2are not jointly 
significant 
0.00536** 0.00185** Omitted since age & age2are 
not jointly significant  (0.00250) (0.000852) 
None_AFHPSP –0.122 –0.0403 –0.501** –0.172** 0.476 0.135 
 (0.392) (0.131) (0.213) (0.0716) (0.347) (0.0979) 
AFHPSP Reference Category 
Post_2004 –0.218 –0.0701 –0.0129 –0.00443 0.341 0.0980 
 (0.408) (0.129) (0.262) (0.0905) (0.426) (0.122) 
Prior_2004 Reference Category 
Constant 4.782**  13.11***  7.604***  
 (2.200)  (4.356)  (1.976)  
Observations 96 96 279 279 119 119 
Standard errors in parentheses 




Pathology Dermatology Emergency Medicine 





CivMilGap 0.00107 0.000348 –0.00173 –0.000578 –0.0135** –0.00442** 
 (0.00384) (0.00125) (0.00365) (0.00122) (0.00640) (0.00209) 
female 0.255 0.0801 0.0462 0.0154 –0.323* –0.112* 
 (0.327) (0.0979) (0.289) (0.0952) (0.177) (0.0642) 
male Reference Category 
minority –0.930** –0.340** –0.221 –0.0772 –0.487*** –0.173*** 
 (0.362) (0.136) (0.344) (0.125) (0.178) (0.0667) 
white Reference Category 
lt_lcdr –0.227 –0.0732 –1.234*** –0.341*** –0.319 –0.100 
 (0.456) (0.145) (0.461) (0.0997) (0.233) (0.0694) 
cdr_cpt Reference Category 
YOS –0.0350 –0.0115 –0.328** –0.110** –0.00557 –0.00183 
 (0.0581) (0.0190) (0.161) (0.0523) (0.0306) (0.0100) 
YOS2 Omitted since YOS & 
YOS2are not jointly 
0.00858 0.00287   
 (0.00595) (0.00196)   
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Variables 
Pathology Dermatology Emergency Medicine 






age 0.0207 0.00679 –0.106* –0.0356* –0.0620* –0.0204* 
 (0.0489) (0.0160) (0.0597) (0.0197) (0.0327) (0.0107) 
age2 Omitted since age & age2are not jointly significant  
None_AFHPSP –0.312 –0.106 0.107 0.0354 –0.278* –0.0939 
 (0.298) (0.104) (0.271) (0.0889) (0.165) (0.0572) 
AFHPSP Reference Category 
Post_2004 –0.228 –0.0744 0.0148 0.00496 –0.220 –0.0716 
 (0.325) (0.105) (0.365) (0.122) (0.207) (0.0668) 
Prior_2004 Reference Category 
Constant 0.557  8.349***  4.819***  
 (1.473)  (2.614)  (1.167)  
Observations 119 119 147 147 425 425 
Standard errors in parentheses 




Family Practice Internal Medicine Neurology 





CivMilGap –0.0273*** –0.00959*** –0.0321*** –0.0112*** 0.0189 0.00698 
 (0.00453) (0.00158) (0.00865) (0.00300) (0.0205) (0.00758) 
female –0.129 –0.0460 –0.182 –0.0642 0.240 0.0841 
 (0.104) (0.0374) (0.177) (0.0633) (1.077) (0.357) 
male Reference Category 
minority –0.403*** –0.149*** –0.328* –0.118* –1.586** –0.570*** 
 (0.112) (0.0426) (0.187) (0.0688) (0.783) (0.219) 
white Reference Category 
lt_lcdr –0.271 –0.0912 –1.251*** –0.300*** –2.987** –0.769*** 
 (0.200) (0.0641) (0.484) (0.0679) (1.335) (0.187) 
cdr_cpt Reference Category 
YOS –0.0425 –0.0149 –0.241*** –0.0838*** –0.400* –0.147* 
 (0.0364) (0.0128) (0.0727) (0.0251) (0.213) (0.0790) 
YOS2 –0.000959 –0.000337 0.00402* 0.00140* 0.00659 0.00243 
 (0.00112) (0.000395) (0.00220) (0.000764) (0.00595) (0.00219) 
age 0.00970 0.00341 –0.00198 –0.000689 –0.0797 –0.0293 
 (0.0158) (0.00556) (0.0253) (0.00878) (0.0834) (0.0306) 
age2 Omitted since age & age2are not jointly significant  
None_AFHPSP 0.0681 0.0238 0.244 0.0824 –2.005** –0.684*** 
 (0.113) (0.0392) (0.266) (0.0870) (0.871) (0.211) 
AFHPSP Reference Category 
Post_2004 –0.426*** –0.145*** 0.0385 0.0134 –0.346 –0.125 
 (0.100) (0.0325) (0.203) (0.0707) (0.763) (0.266) 
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Variables 
Family Practice Internal Medicine Neurology 





Prior_2004 Reference Category 
Constant 2.020***  4.400***  9.361**  
 (0.601)  (1.112)  (4.674)  
Observations 921 921 296 296 43 43 
Standard errors in parentheses 




Pediatrics Psychiatry Diagnostic Radiology 





CivMilGap –0.0179*** –0.00604*** –0.0224*** –0.00821*** –0.00621*** –0.00210*** 
 (0.00641) (0.00216) (0.00707) (0.00258) (0.00178) (0.000591) 
female –0.0258 –0.00873 0.0778 0.0283 –0.140 –0.0486 
 (0.160) (0.0540) (0.216) (0.0782) (0.253) (0.0901) 
male Reference Category 
minority –0.437** –0.159** 0.152 0.0544 –0.249 –0.0872 
 (0.206) (0.0784) (0.258) (0.0902) (0.223) (0.0806) 
white Reference Category 
lt_lcdr –1.494*** –0.310*** –1.814*** –0.514*** –0.288 –0.0939 
 (0.491) (0.0508) (0.478) (0.0938) (0.262) (0.0821) 
cdr_cpt Reference Category 
YOS –0.113 –0.0384 –0.230** –0.0842** –0.0467 –0.0158 
 (0.0796) (0.0269) (0.0910) (0.0332) (0.0323) (0.0109) 
YOS2 0.000183 0.0000618 0.00268 0.000982 Omitted since YOS & 
YOS2are not jointly 
significant  (0.00297) (0.00100) (0.00210) (0.000767) 
age –0.579** –0.196** –0.0297 –0.0109 –0.656** –0.222** 
 (0.280) (0.0940) (0.0351) (0.0128) (0.262) (0.0869) 
age2 0.00688* 0.00233* Omitted since age & 
age2are not jointly 
significant 
0.00733** 0.00248** 
 (0.00359) (0.00121) (0.00309) (0.00102) 
None_AFHPSP 0.118 0.0393 –0.0528 –0.0194 –0.188 –0.0639 
 (0.207) (0.0678) (0.214) (0.0790) (0.195) (0.0664) 
AFHPSP Reference Category 
Post_2004 –0.103 –0.0346 0.140 0.0518 0.432* 0.147* 
 (0.166) (0.0556) (0.223) (0.0833) (0.223) (0.0762) 
Prior_2004 Reference Category 
Constant 15.16***  5.912***  16.99***  
 (5.149)  (1.376)  (5.626)  
Observations 362 362 215 215 286 286 
Standard errors in parentheses 




Variables Occupational Medicine Urology Probit Marginal Effect Probit Marginal Effect 
CivMilGap –0.00301 –0.000999 –0.00599* –0.00208* 
 (0.00730) (0.00243) (0.00344) (0.00118) 
female –0.290 –0.100 –0.371 –0.137 
 (0.385) (0.138) (0.475) (0.184) 
male Reference Category 
minority –1.007** –0.376** –0.226 –0.0818 
 (0.435) (0.161) (0.465) (0.174) 
white Reference Category 
lt_lcdr –0.653 –0.235 0.356 0.125 
 (0.503) (0.188) (0.306) (0.108) 
cdr_cpt Reference Category 
YOS –0.0546 –0.0181   
 (0.0549) (0.0182)   
YOS2 Omitted since YOS & YOS2are not jointly 
significant 
  
   
age –0.0385 –0.0128   
 (0.0487) (0.0161)   
age2 Omitted since age & age2are not jointly 
significant 
  
   
None_AFHPSP 0.0791 0.0262 –0.0201 –0.00698 
 (0.323) (0.107) (0.309) (0.107) 
AFHPSP Reference Category 
Post_2004 –0.552 –0.172* –0.0947 –0.0328 
 (0.360) (0.102) (0.334) (0.116) 
Prior_2004 Reference Category 
Constant 4.254**  1.327**  
 (1.699)  (0.571)  
Observations 94 94 94 94 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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APPENDIX C. RETENTION PROJECTION MODELS 
The Aggregate Retention Projection Model 



















2002 452 158 0.740983607       0.740983607
2003 417 158 0.725217391 0.740983607     0.740983607
2004 490 132 0.787781350 0.733100499     0.736253742
2005 405 150 0.729729730 0.751327449 0.751327449   0.751712025
2006 298 182 0.620833333 0.74592802 0.747576157 0.74592802 0.745117336
2007 281 149 0.653488372 0.720909082 0.712781471 0.715890451 0.707832135
2008 192 156 0.551724138 0.709672297 0.668017145 0.697958196 0.691529006
2009 179 122 0.594684385 0.687108274 0.608681948 0.638943893 0.649587546
2010 158 138 0.533783784 0.675555288 0.599965632 0.605182557 0.633116598
2011 151 110 0.578544061 0.659802899 0.560064102 0.58342017 0.603316754
2012       0.651677015 0.569004077 0.564684092 0.595884946
        90% Upper CI 0.657182885     
    90% Lower CI 0.480825269   
        
      MAD 0.084218064 0.060369431 0.075710869 0.065190824
      MSE 0.009343469 0.005498203 0.008001261 0.0060919
      MAPE 14.15% 10.21% 12.98% 10.84%
                
              Alpha 























ACTUAL RETENTION RATE 
MEAN FORECASTING
3 PERIODS MOVING 
AVERAGE FORECASTING





Primary Care Specialists’ Retention Projection Model 



















2002 166 46 0.783018868       0.783018868 
2003 153 60 0.718309859 0.783018868     0.783018868 
2004 182 51 0.781115880 0.750664364     0.763606165 
2005 154 59 0.723004695 0.760814869 0.760814869   0.76885908 
2006 123 70 0.637305699 0.751362325 0.740810145 0.751362325 0.755102764 
2007 96 59 0.619354839 0.728551 0.713808758 0.714934033 0.719763645 
2008 81 65 0.554794521 0.71035164 0.659888411 0.690195278 0.689641003 
2009 64 52 0.551724138 0.688129194 0.603818353 0.633614938 0.649187058 
2010 55 44 0.555555556 0.671078562 0.575291166 0.590794799 0.619948182 
2011 57 36 0.612903226 0.658242673 0.554024738 0.570357263 0.600630394 
2012       0.653708728 0.573394306 0.56874436 0.604312244 
        90% Upper CI 0.670238973     
    90% Lower CI 0.47654964   
        
      MAD 0.089894235 0.067367249 0.084118764 0.072805982 
      MSE 0.009964718 0.005525575 0.008372621 0.006948242 
      MAPE 14.96% 11.18% 14.31% 11.98% 
                
              Alpha 
























ACTUAL RETENTION RATE 
MEAN FORECASTING
3 PERIODS MOVING 
AVERAGE FORECASTING





Surgical Specialists’ Retention Projection Model 


















2002 126 41 0.754491018       0.754491018 
2003 119 45 0.725609756 0.754491018     0.754491018 
2004 140 38 0.786516854 0.740050387     0.745826639 
2005 107 38 0.737931034 0.755539209 0.755539209   0.758033704 
2006 66 49 0.573913043 0.751137166 0.750019215 0.751137166 0.752002903 
2007 74 34 0.685185185 0.715692341 0.699453644 0.705992672 0.698575945 
2008 47 35 0.573170732 0.710607815 0.665676421 0.695886529 0.694558717 
2009 51 30 0.629629630 0.690973946 0.61075632 0.642549999 0.658142322 
2010 41 42 0.493975904 0.683305907 0.629328516 0.615474648 0.649588514 
2011 29 31 0.483333333 0.66226924 0.565592088 0.595490363 0.602904731 
2012       0.644375649 0.535646289 0.5450274 0.567033312 
            90% upper CI 0.691046387 
      90% lower CI 0.443020236 
        
      MAD 0.096414943 0.076710453 0.094553925 0.07847105 
      MSE 0.014017597 0.009361051 0.012401431 0.009872208 
      MAPE 17.41% 14.10% 17.53% 14.09% 
                
              Alpha 



























3 PERIODS MOVING 
AVERAGE FORECASTING





Other Specialties Retention Projection Model 


















2002 160 71 0.692640693       0.692640693 
2003 145 53 0.732323232 0.692640693     0.692640693 
2004 168 43 0.796208531 0.712481962     0.704545455 
2005 144 53 0.730964467 0.740390819 0.740390819   0.732044377 
2006 109 63 0.633720930 0.738034231 0.75316541 0.738034231 0.731720404 
2007 111 56 0.664670659 0.717171571 0.720297976 0.72330429 0.702320562 
2008 64 56 0.533333333 0.708421419 0.676452019 0.706391147 0.691025591 
2009 64 40 0.615384615 0.683408835 0.610574974 0.640672347 0.643717914 
2010 62 52 0.543859649 0.674905808 0.604462869 0.611777384 0.635217924 
2011 65 43 0.601851852 0.660345123 0.564192533 0.589312064 0.607810442 
2012       0.654495796 0.587032039 0.573607362 0.606022865 
            90% upper CI 0.730473851 
      90% lower CI 0.481571879 
        
      MAD 0.080255712 0.061527002 0.073625 0.061268592 
      MSE 0.008687667 0.006149615 0.008279618 0.006116763 
      MAPE 13.25% 10.50% 12.74% 10.02% 
                
              Alpha 



























3 PERIODS MOVING 
AVERAGE FORECASTING





Anesthesiologists’ Retention Projection Model 


















2002 21 20 0.512195122       0.512195122 
2003 23 11 0.676470588 0.512195122     0.512195122 
2004 36 8 0.818181818 0.594332855     0.561477762 
2005 32 16 0.666666667 0.668949176 0.668949176   0.638488979 
2006 28 14 0.666666667 0.668378549 0.720439691 0.668378549 0.646942285 
2007 27 16 0.627906977 0.668036172 0.717171717 0.706996435 0.6528596 
2008 14 12 0.538461538 0.661347973 0.65374677 0.694855532 0.645373813 
2009 16 10 0.615384615 0.643792768 0.611011727 0.624925462 0.61330013 
2010 18 15 0.545454545 0.640241749 0.59391771 0.612104949 0.613925476 
2011 18 13 0.580645161 0.629709838 0.566433566 0.581801919 0.593384197 
2012       0.62480337 0.580494774 0.569986465 0.589562486 
        90% upper CI 0.661837651     
    90% lower CI 0.499151898   
        
      MAD 0.080821609 0.046807593 0.05242389 0.076004549 
      MSE 0.011779259 0.003817914 0.005875299 0.012330467 
      MAPE 12.43% 8.01% 9.31% 11.31% 
                
              Alpha 



























3 PERIODS MOVING 
AVERAGE FORECASTING





General Surgeons’ Retention Projection Model 


















2002 23 3 0.884615385       0.884615385 
2003 19 5 0.791666667 0.884615385     0.884615385 
2004 30 4 0.882352941 0.838141026     0.856730769 
2005 19 9 0.678571429 0.852878331 0.852878331   0.864417421 
2006 13 11 0.541666667 0.809301605 0.784197012 0.809301605 0.808663623 
2007 14 7 0.666666667 0.755774618 0.700863679 0.723564426 0.728564536 
2008 9 6 0.600000000 0.740923292 0.628968254 0.692314426 0.709995175 
2009 13 4 0.764705882 0.720791393 0.602777778 0.62172619 0.676996623 
2010 7 10 0.411764706 0.726280705 0.677124183 0.643259804 0.703309401 
2011 7 6 0.538461538 0.691334483 0.592156863 0.610784314 0.615845992 
2012       0.676047188 0.571644042 0.578733032 0.592630656 
            90% upper CI 0.797826473 
      90% lower CI 0.387434839 
        
      MAD 0.146715239 0.137283631 0.143940781 0.133327255 
      MSE 0.029402672 0.02724743 0.027108588 0.02552577 
      MAPE 26.58% 25.14% 26.95% 23.95% 
                
              Alpha 



























3 PERIODS MOVING 
AVERAGE FORECASTING





Neurological Surgeons’ Retention Model 


















2002 2 1 0.666666667       0.666666667 
2003 4 1 0.800000000 0.666666667     0.666666667 
2004 3 3 0.500000000 0.733333333     0.706666667 
2005 0 2 0.000000000 0.655555556 0.655555556   0.644666667 
2006 1 0 1.000000000 0.491666667 0.433333333 0.491666667 0.451266667 
2007 1 1 0.500000000 0.593333333 0.5 0.575 0.615886667 
2008 2 1 0.666666667 0.577777778 0.5 0.5 0.581120667 
2009 0 2 0.000000000 0.59047619 0.722222222 0.541666667 0.606784467 
2010 1 0 1.000000000 0.516666667 0.388888889 0.541666667 0.424749127 
2011 1 1 0.500000000 0.57037037 0.555555556 0.541666667 0.597324389 
2012       0.563333333 0.5 0.541666667 0.568127072 
          90% upper CI 1.182756628   
     90% lower CI -0.099423295  
        
      MAD 0.317439741 0.396825397 0.298611111 0.334910266 
      MSE 0.151579518 0.239541446 0.132835648 0.167390345 
      MAPE N/A N/A N/A N/A 
                
              Alpha 
              0.3 
































3 PERIODS MOVING 
AVERAGE FORECASTING





OB/GYN Specialists’ Retention Projection Model 


















2002 28 18 0.608695652       0.608695652 
2003 22 18 0.550000000 0.608695652     0.608695652 
2004 37 14 0.725490196 0.579347826     0.591086957 
2005 42 6 0.875000000 0.628061949 0.628061949   0.631407928 
2006 25 19 0.568181818 0.689796462 0.716830065 0.689796462 0.70448555 
2007 21 9 0.700000000 0.665473533 0.722890671 0.679668004 0.66359443 
2008 12 6 0.666666667 0.671227944 0.714393939 0.717168004 0.674516101 
2009 17 7 0.708333333 0.670576333 0.644949495 0.702462121 0.672161271 
2010 15 14 0.517241379 0.675295958 0.691666667 0.660795455 0.68301289 
2011 12 7 0.631578947 0.657734338 0.630747126 0.648060345 0.633281437 
2012       0.655118799 0.61905122 0.630955082 0.63277069 
          90% upper CI 0.742686929   
     90% lower CI 0.519223234  
        
      MAD 0.092716159 0.10069217 0.059725777 0.09121064 
      MSE 0.014319458 0.017188423 0.006444629 0.014400412 
      MAPE 14.01% 15.37% 10.51% 13.87% 
                
              Alpha 




























3 PERIODS MOVING 
AVERAGE FORECASTING





Ophthalmologists’ Retention Projection Model 


















2002 9 3 0.750000000       0.75 
2003 11 2 0.846153846 0.75     0.75 
2004 12 1 0.923076923 0.798076923     0.778846154 
2005 7 3 0.700000000 0.83974359 0.83974359   0.822115385 
2006 5 6 0.454545455 0.804807692 0.823076923 0.804807692 0.785480769 
2007 8 4 0.666666667 0.734755245 0.692540793 0.730944056 0.686200175 
2008 5 2 0.714285714 0.723407148 0.607070707 0.686072261 0.680340122 
2009 5 2 0.714285714 0.722104086 0.611832612 0.633874459 0.6905238 
2010 4 4 0.500000000 0.72112679 0.698412698 0.637445887 0.697652374 
2011 0 3 0.000000000 0.696557147 0.642857143 0.648809524 0.638356662 
2012       0.626901432 0.404761905 0.482142857 0.446849663 
            90% upper CI 0.853835786 
      90% lower CI 0.03986354 
        
      MAD 0.190430222 0.226441019 0.218236624 0.178520596 
      MSE 0.078439085 0.090091112 0.095653726 0.067015845 
      MAPE N/A N/A N/A N/A 
                
              Alpha 
              0.3 































3 PERIODS MOVING 
AVERAGE FORECASTING





Orthopedic Surgeons’ Retention Projection Model 


















2002 38 9 0.808510638       0.808510638 
2003 30 15 0.666666667 0.808510638     0.808510638 
2004 32 7 0.820512821 0.737588652     0.765957447 
2005 17 12 0.586206897 0.765230042 0.765230042   0.782324059 
2006 14 7 0.666666667 0.720474256 0.691128795 0.720474256 0.72348891 
2007 19 9 0.678571429 0.709712738 0.691128795 0.685013263 0.706442237 
2008 12 14 0.461538462 0.70452252 0.643814997 0.687989453 0.698080995 
2009 8 9 0.470588235 0.669810511 0.602258852 0.598245863 0.627118235 
2010 9 5 0.642857143 0.644907727 0.536899375 0.569341198 0.580159235 
2011 6 7 0.461538462 0.644679884 0.524994613 0.563388817 0.598968607 
2012       0.626365742 0.524994613 0.509130575 0.557739564 
        90% upper CI 0.695778761     
    90% lower CI 0.354210465   
        
      MAD 0.124015391 0.099914816 0.09828739 0.118934461 
      MSE 0.021687356 0.014088713 0.014381894 0.018759508 
      MAPE 23.28% 19.11% 19.79% 22.01% 
                
              Alpha 



























3 PERIODS MOVING 
AVERAGE FORECASTING





Otolaryngologists’ Retention Projection Model 


















2002 17 3 0.850000000       0.85 
2003 17 3 0.850000000 0.85     0.85 
2004 15 3 0.833333333 0.85     0.85 
2005 12 2 0.857142857 0.844444444 0.844444444   0.845 
2006 7 2 0.777777778 0.847619048 0.846825397 0.847619048 0.848642857 
2007 6 4 0.600000000 0.833650794 0.822751323 0.829563492 0.827383333 
2008 2 5 0.285714286 0.794708995 0.744973545 0.767063492 0.759168333 
2009 4 2 0.666666667 0.721995465 0.554497354 0.63015873 0.617132119 
2010 4 4 0.500000000 0.715079365 0.517460317 0.582539683 0.631992483 
2011 1 6 0.142857143 0.691181658 0.484126984 0.513095238 0.592394738 
2012       0.636349206 0.436507937 0.398809524 0.45753346 
            90% upper CI 0.782971393 
      90% lower CI 0.132095526 
        
      MAD 0.184509392 0.176379441 0.21167328 0.159064068 
      MSE 0.07432948 0.056402566 0.072416022 0.055918749 
      MAPE 73.85% 66.78% 82.81% 62.74% 
                
              Alpha 































3 PERIODS MOVING 
AVERAGE FORECASTING





Urologists’ Retention Projection Model 


















2002 9 4 0.692307692       0.692307692 
2003 16 1 0.941176471 0.692307692     0.692307692 
2004 11 6 0.647058824 0.816742081     0.766968326 
2005 10 4 0.714285714 0.760180995 0.760180995   0.730995475 
2006 1 4 0.200000000 0.748707175 0.767507003 0.748707175 0.725982547 
2007 5 0 1.000000000 0.63896574 0.520448179 0.625630252 0.568187783 
2008 5 1 0.833333333 0.699138117 0.638095238 0.640336134 0.697731448 
2009 4 4 0.500000000 0.718308862 0.677777778 0.686904762 0.738412014 
2010 1 5 0.166666667 0.691020254 0.777777778 0.633333333 0.66688841 
2011 2 1 0.666666667 0.632758745 0.5 0.625 0.516821887 
2012       0.636149537 0.444444444 0.541666667 0.561775321 
            90% upper CI 1.103184214 
      90% lower CI 0.020366427 
        
      MAD 0.253883816 0.320535394 0.30188537 0.263040359 
      MSE 0.096224811 0.146442563 0.122154578 0.098624002 
      MAPE 83.22% 112.68% 109.76% 82.23% 
                
              Alpha 
































3 PERIODS MOVING 
AVERAGE FORECASTING





Occupational Medicine Retention Projection Model 


















2002 10 0 1.000000000       1 
2003 9 4 0.692307692 1     1 
2004 6 3 0.666666667 0.846153846     0.907692308 
2005 8 1 0.888888889 0.786324786 0.786324786   0.835384615 
2006 9 5 0.642857143 0.811965812 0.749287749 0.811965812 0.851435897 
2007 7 5 0.583333333 0.778144078 0.732804233 0.722680098 0.788862271 
2008 6 5 0.545454545 0.745675621 0.705026455 0.695436508 0.72720359 
2009 3 1 0.750000000 0.71707261 0.590548341 0.665133478 0.672678876 
2010 4 3 0.571428571 0.721188534 0.626262626 0.630411255 0.695875214 
2011 3 2 0.600000000 0.704548538 0.622294372 0.612554113 0.658541221 
2012       0.694093684 0.64047619 0.616720779 0.640978855 
        90% upper CI 0.843045714     
    90% lower CI 0.437906667   
        
      MAD 0.160124441 0.107802515 0.102473452 0.162043105 
      MSE 0.0309433 0.014082894 0.013558124 0.033255909 
      MAPE 25.26% 16.79% 16.90% 25.50% 
                
              Alpha 





























3 PERIODS MOVING 
AVERAGE FORECASTING





Pathologists’ Retention Projection Model 


















2002 19 6 0.760000000       0.76 
2003 9 5 0.642857143 0.76     0.76 
2004 13 5 0.722222222 0.701428571     0.724857143 
2005 8 4 0.666666667 0.708359788 0.708359788   0.724066667 
2006 5 3 0.625000000 0.697936508 0.677248677 0.697936508 0.706846667 
2007 8 1 0.888888889 0.683349206 0.671296296 0.664186508 0.682292667 
2008 7 3 0.700000000 0.71760582 0.726851852 0.725694444 0.744271533 
2009 8 1 0.888888889 0.715090703 0.737962963 0.720138889 0.730990073 
2010 4 5 0.444444444 0.736815476 0.825925926 0.775694444 0.778359718 
2011 5 0 1.000000000 0.704329806 0.677777778 0.730555556 0.678185136 
2012       0.733896825 0.777777778 0.758333333 0.774729595 
      90% upper CI 1.032861711       
   90% lower CI 0.43493194    
        
      MAD 0.137505672 0.170430839 0.18212963 0.147057906 
      MSE 0.029652988 0.046381388 0.044545755 0.034262361 
      MAPE 19.95% 25.42% 26.85% 21.66% 
                
              Alpha 





























3 PERIODS MOVING 
AVERAGE FORECASTING





Dermatologists’ Retention Projection Model 


















2002 16 7 0.695652174       0.695652174 
2003 13 6 0.684210526 0.695652174     0.695652174 
2004 16 1 0.941176471 0.68993135     0.69221968 
2005 14 4 0.777777778 0.773679724 0.773679724   0.766906717 
2006 8 9 0.470588235 0.774704237 0.801054925 0.774704237 0.770168035 
2007 12 5 0.705882353 0.713881037 0.729847495 0.718438252 0.680294095 
2008 6 6 0.500000000 0.712547923 0.651416122 0.723856209 0.687970573 
2009 5 4 0.555555556 0.682183934 0.558823529 0.613562092 0.631579401 
2010 3 4 0.428571429 0.666355387 0.587145969 0.558006536 0.608772247 
2011 7 1 0.875000000 0.639934947 0.494708995 0.547502334 0.554712002 
2012       0.663441452 0.619708995 0.589781746 0.650798401 
            90% upper CI 0.983029818 
      90% lower CI 0.318566984 
        
      MAD 0.154547202 0.150297075 0.175911237 0.151213421 
      MSE 0.036536721 0.043214859 0.045021454 0.03653341 
      MAPE 26.92% 26.50% 31.54% 25.19% 
                
              Alpha 




























3 PERIODS MOVING 
AVERAGE FORECASTING





Emergency Medicine’s Retention Projection Model 


















2002 58 9 0.865671642       0.865671642 
2003 49 15 0.765625000 0.865671642     0.865671642 
2004 47 15 0.758064516 0.815648321     0.835657649 
2005 35 15 0.700000000 0.796453719 0.796453719   0.812379709 
2006 27 14 0.658536585 0.772340289 0.741229839 0.772340289 0.778665797 
2007 24 17 0.585365854 0.749579549 0.7055337 0.720556525 0.742627033 
2008 14 11 0.560000000 0.722210599 0.64796748 0.675491739 0.695448679 
2009 14 8 0.636363636 0.699037657 0.601300813 0.62597561 0.654814076 
2010 15 10 0.600000000 0.691203404 0.59390983 0.610066519 0.649278944 
2011 18 10 0.642857143 0.681069693 0.598787879 0.595432373 0.634495261 
2012       0.677248438 0.626406926 0.609805195 0.637003825 
        90% upper CI 0.73976949     
    90% lower CI 0.513044363   
        
      MAD 0.098489127 0.067500651 0.072060905 0.08654998 
      MSE 0.01139606 0.005932668 0.007837416 0.009889603 
      MAPE 15.53% 10.85% 11.95% 13.45% 
                
              Alpha 



























3 PERIODS MOVING 
AVERAGE FORECASTING





Family Practice Retention Projection Model 


















2002 81 21 0.794117647       0.794117647 
2003 83 29 0.741071429 0.794117647     0.794117647 
2004 106 28 0.791044776 0.767594538     0.778203782 
2005 90 43 0.676691729 0.775411284 0.775411284   0.78205608 
2006 64 43 0.598130841 0.750731395 0.736269311 0.750731395 0.750446775 
2007 53 31 0.630952381 0.720211284 0.688622449 0.701734694 0.704751995 
2008 39 33 0.541666667 0.705334801 0.635258317 0.674204932 0.682612111 
2009 39 27 0.590909091 0.681953639 0.590249963 0.611860405 0.640328477 
2010 28 28 0.500000000 0.67057307 0.587842713 0.590414745 0.625502661 
2011 35 20 0.636363636 0.651620507 0.544191919 0.565882035 0.587851863 
2012       0.65009482 0.575757576 0.567234848 0.602405395 
        90% upper CI 0.703453533     
    90% lower CI 0.448061619   
        
      MAD 0.095290899 0.081256186 0.089628132 0.084638486 
      MSE 0.012085306 0.008160775 0.009907483 0.009237686 
      MAPE 16.28% 13.75% 15.65% 14.29% 
                
              Alpha 
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Internal Medicine Retention Projection Model 


















2002 41 11 0.788461538       0.788461538 
2003 20 15 0.571428571 0.788461538     0.788461538 
2004 29 7 0.805555556 0.679945055     0.723351648 
2005 27 6 0.818181818 0.721815222 0.721815222   0.748012821 
2006 22 10 0.687500000 0.745906871 0.731721982 0.745906871 0.76906352 
2007 15 13 0.535714286 0.734225497 0.770412458 0.720666486 0.744594464 
2008 15 10 0.600000000 0.701140295 0.680465368 0.711737915 0.68193041 
2009 10 10 0.500000000 0.686691681 0.607738095 0.660349026 0.657351287 
2010 11 7 0.611111111 0.663355221 0.545238095 0.580803571 0.610145901 
2011 9 8 0.529411765 0.65755032 0.57037037 0.561706349 0.610435464 
2012       0.644736465 0.546840959 0.560130719 0.586128354 
        90% upper CI 0.728707892     
    90% lower CI 0.364974025   
        
      MAD 0.129349199 0.095760262 0.096341356 0.109013353 
      MSE 0.019913108 0.012917767 0.01296289 0.01634509 
      MAPE 21.98% 16.50% 17.46% 18.69% 
                
              Alpha 
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Neurologists’ Retention Projection Model 


















2002 5 2 0.714285714       0.714285714 
2003 1 4 0.200000000 0.714285714     0.714285714 
2004 4 0 1.000000000 0.457142857     0.56 
2005 5 1 0.833333333 0.638095238 0.638095238   0.692 
2006 3 3 0.500000000 0.686904762 0.677777778 0.686904762 0.7344 
2007 2 0 1.000000000 0.64952381 0.777777778 0.633333333 0.66408 
2008 1 2 0.333333333 0.707936508 0.777777778 0.833333333 0.764856 
2009 1 1 0.500000000 0.654421769 0.611111111 0.666666667 0.6353992 
2010 3 1 0.750000000 0.635119048 0.611111111 0.583333333 0.59477944 
2011 2 2 0.500000000 0.647883598 0.527777778 0.645833333 0.641345608 
2012       0.633095238 0.583333333 0.520833333 0.598941926 
        90% upper CI 0.976676537   
    90% lower CI 0.189990129   
        
      MAD 0.286839044 0.188208617 0.255456349 0.281047454 
      MSE 0.106034372 0.049863406 0.082700125 0.099385252 
      MAPE 66.16% 37.26% 51.46% 67.12% 
                
              Alpha 
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Pediatrics Retention Projection Model 


















2002 34 14 0.708333333       0.708333333 
2003 41 12 0.773584906 0.708333333     0.708333333 
2004 41 13 0.759259259 0.740959119     0.727908805 
2005 29 9 0.763157895 0.747059166 0.747059166   0.737313941 
2006 28 12 0.700000000 0.751083848 0.76533402 0.751083848 0.745067127 
2007 21 10 0.677419355 0.740867079 0.740805718 0.749000515 0.731546989 
2008 21 17 0.552631579 0.730292458 0.71352575 0.724959127 0.715308699 
2009 12 14 0.461538462 0.704912332 0.643350311 0.673302207 0.666505563 
2010 12 6 0.666666667 0.674490599 0.563863132 0.597897349 0.605015432 
2011 10 6 0.625000000 0.673621273 0.560278902 0.589564015 0.623510803 
2012       0.668759145 0.584401709 0.576459177 0.623957562 
            90% upper CI 0.782551476 
      90% lower CI 0.465363648 
        
      MAD 0.07685133 0.093578538 0.101826934 0.07249171 
      MSE 0.011634053 0.011749343 0.014709836 0.009238647 
      MAPE 13.72% 16.44% 18.49% 12.63% 
                
              Alpha 
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Psychiatrists’ Retention Projection Model 


















2002 9 9 0.500000000       0.5 
2003 17 2 0.894736842 0.5     0.5 
2004 18 10 0.642857143 0.697368421     0.618421053 
2005 18 5 0.782608696 0.679197995 0.679197995   0.62575188 
2006 20 9 0.689655172 0.70505067 0.773400894 0.70505067 0.672808924 
2007 9 12 0.428571429 0.701971571 0.705040337 0.752464463 0.677862799 
2008 15 3 0.833333333 0.65640488 0.633611766 0.63592311 0.603075388 
2009 12 10 0.545454545 0.681680374 0.650519978 0.683542157 0.672152771 
2010 10 9 0.526315789 0.664652145 0.602453102 0.62425362 0.634143304 
2011 10 8 0.555555556 0.649281439 0.635034556 0.583418774 0.601795049 
2012       0.639908851 0.542441963 0.615164806 0.587923201 
        90% upper CI 0.796183384     
    90% lower CI 0.288700543   
        
      MAD 0.154074553 0.132004092 0.133431236 0.150354505 
      MSE 0.035805525 0.022454775 0.028925147 0.036253819 
      MAPE 24.58% 23.12% 25.07% 23.14% 
                
              Alpha 
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Radiologists Retention Projection Model 


















2002 30 18 0.625000000       0.625 
2003 32 10 0.761904762 0.625     0.625 
2004 32 4 0.888888889 0.693452381     0.666071429 
2005 29 8 0.783783784 0.758597884 0.758597884   0.732916667 
2006 16 10 0.615384615 0.764894359 0.811525812 0.764894359 0.748176802 
2007 26 4 0.866666667 0.73499241 0.762685763 0.762490512 0.708339146 
2008 6 17 0.260869565 0.756938119 0.755278355 0.788680989 0.755837402 
2009 8 5 0.615384615 0.686071183 0.580973616 0.631676158 0.607347051 
2010 9 8 0.529411765 0.677235362 0.580973616 0.589576366 0.60975832 
2011 5 9 0.357142857 0.660810518 0.468555315 0.568083153 0.585654354 
2012       0.630443752 0.500646412 0.440702201 0.517100905 
            90% upper CI 0.886327878 
      90% lower CI 0.147873932 
        
      MAD 0.184106394 0.1453003 0.17814896 0.168174722 
      MSE 0.051378935 0.044373322 0.060028623 0.046378911 
      MAPE 44.14% 40.45% 51.95% 39.95% 
                
              Alpha 
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